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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF 
 
Maximilian Martini, for the Master of Arts degree in Literature, presented on 10 April 2017, at 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale. 
 
TITLE: Abolitionism and the Logic of Martyrdom: Death as an Argument for John Brown, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Frederick Douglass 
 
MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Joseph Shapiro 
 
This paper looks at three significant instances of the representation of abolitionist 
martyrdom in nineteenth-century America to first sketch the abolitionist discourse and its varied 
conceptualizations of martyrdom and second question the rationale and success of this strategy 
for manumitting slaves. Accordingly, I start with Brown, who (with help from sympathetic 
Northerners and the megaphone of the Associated Press) appealed to the martyrological tradition 
in order to transform his paramilitary failure at Harper’s Ferry into a powerful symbol of his own 
abolitionist righteousness over and against the state’s iniquity. Though the superficial differences 
between Brown and arch-sentimentalist Harriet Beecher Stowe have discouraged their 
comparison, a look at the logic of martyrdom reveals a similar strategy at work in both Brown’s 
martyrization and Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which makes death an argument for the manumission of 
slaves. I argue that this hugely successful novel reveals the potency of martyrological thinking in 
19th-century America as it also reveals martyrdom and its logic to be the foundation of 
sentimentalism like Stowe’s. Finally, I look at the speeches and nonfiction of Frederick Douglass 
to argue that his own martyrization of John Brown is different than what we see in Brown and 
Stowe because it provokes change rather than validating abolitionism that already exists. To 
various degrees, these writers seem aware that there may be a problem in the rhetorical use of 
martyrdom against the putatively secular state; they consequently employ different strategies for 
negotiating the meaninglessness of suffering and death with the soteriological and eschatological 
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assumptions of their day. These negotiations reveal the extent to which martyrdom could be 
taken seriously as a hammer of abolitionism by different authors and thus also indicate the 
degree to which martyrdom can be taken seriously as a political solution whatsoever. Ultimately, 
I want to argue that martyrdom and its logic are at best dubious when applied to secular politics 
precisely because it relies upon the analogy to Jesus Christ as savior, which cannot hold outside 
Christianity. Simply put, the death of a mortal cannot register eschatologically and, more 
importantly, death does not make a cogent argument for anything. Instead, martyrdom is 
preaching to the choir par excellance; whether the choir is Christian, abolitionist, or something 
else, martyrological appeals do not grow its membership, as martyrologists since early modernity 
have assumed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this thesis, I will look at three significant instances of the representation of abolitionist 
martyrdom in nineteenth-century America to first sketch the abolitionist discourse and its varied 
conceptualizations of martyrdom and second question the rationale and success of this strategy 
for manumitting slaves. In other words, I question how someone like John Brown, waiting for 
the gallows, could plausibly imagine that he was “worth more to hang than to any other purpose” 
in his pursuit of the abolition of slavery.  
Accordingly, I start with Brown, who (with help from sympathetic Northerners and the 
megaphone of the Associated Press) appealed to the martyrological tradition in order to 
transform his paramilitary failure at Harper’s Ferry into a powerful symbol of his own 
abolitionist righteousness over and against the state’s iniquity. Though the superficial differences 
between Brown and arch-sentimentalist Harriet Beecher Stowe have discouraged their 
comparison, a look at the logic of martyrdom reveals a similar strategy at work in both Brown’s 
martyrization and Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which makes death an argument for the manumission of 
slaves. I argue that this hugely successful novel reveals the potency of martyrological thinking in 
19th-century America as it also reveals martyrdom and its logic to be the foundation of 
sentimentalism like Stowe’s. Finally, I look at the speeches and nonfiction of Frederick Douglass 
to argue that his own martyrization of John Brown is different than what we see in Brown and 
Stowe because it provokes change rather than validating abolitionism that already exists.  
To various degrees, these writers seem aware that there may be a problem in the 
rhetorical use of martyrdom against the putatively secular state; they consequently employ 
different strategies for negotiating the meaninglessness of suffering and death with the 
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soteriological and eschatological assumptions of their day. These negotiations reveal the extent 
to which martyrdom could be taken seriously as a hammer of abolitionism by different authors 
and thus also indicate the degree to which martyrdom can be taken seriously as a political 
solution whatsoever.  
Ultimately, I want to argue that martyrdom and its logic are at best dubious when applied 
to secular politics precisely because it relies upon the analogy to Jesus Christ as savior, which 
cannot hold outside Christianity. Simply put, the death of a mortal cannot register 
eschatologically and, more importantly, willingness to die does not make a cogent argument for 
anything. Instead, martyrdom is preaching to the choir par excellance; whether the choir is 
Christian, abolitionist, or something else, martyrological appeals do not grow its membership, as 
martyrologists since early modernity have assumed. Consequently, I argue that Douglass’s 
conception of John Brown and movement away from the martyrological tradition should be both 
further studied and better remembered. 
 
 Hazel Catherine Wolf’s On Freedom’s Altar (1952) is probably the first book-length 
study on nineteenth-century abolitionists’ appeal to the logic of martyrdom as a strategy for. It’s 
a strange book that can’t seem to decide whether to extol or to chastise 19th-century abolitionists 
for their application of martyrdom to the problem of slavery; it vacillates between praise and 
criticism in an ultimately confusing attempt at objective historicizing. More importantly, it leaves 
unanswered questions regarding the conceptualization of abolitionist martyrdom and its 
imagined potential in the abolitionist discourse. Wolf argues that America has a long and 
foundational tradition of respect for and credence in martyrdom that was carried over from 
England by the Quakers and Puritans who later extensively relied on the concept to explain the 
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purported sacrifices of the founding fathers in the American Revolutionary War. Specifically, 
she traces the increasing religious zeal of abolitionism from the late 1820s through the Civil War 
by focusing on the martyrizations of abolitionists like Elijah Lovejoy, John Brown, and Abraham 
Lincoln. Though her tone is sometimes oddly caustic,1 Wolf evocatively describes martyrdom’s 
later proliferation in America via a community of orators and abolitionists who extolled those 
who suffered and died for slaves as ideal models and apotheosized proof of the righteousness of 
their cause. Furthermore, she proclaims that martyrdom as a popular concept spurred the Civil 
War by enervating the “abolition crusade” more than any other force in religion or politics (10). 
Her book is thus an early look at the American conceptualization of martyrdom as a potentially 
useful tool in the strategic kit of the antebellum left. 
But while On Freedom’s Altar argues that martyrdom permeates abolitionist thinking 
(and, to some extent, evaluates its political efficacy), Wolf fails to explain or even question the 
functional conceptualization of martyrdom as an assault on the institution of slavery. In other 
words, she doesn’t parse the creation of martyrs or how they could be thought to bolster the 
abolitionist cause, but rather only describes its use by abolitionists and the American left before 
and after the war for better or worse. Early on, she goes as far as to give an American definition 
of martyrdom that she argues is built on analogies to Christian forefathers and Biblical 
exemplars: 
                                               
1 For example, she concludes her book with the following paragraph: 
“So with Abraham Lincoln’s death the Radical Republicans claimed the martyr tradition for their 
own. In the years after 1865 they continued to remind the nation that the principles of the 
Republican party were those of the great American Martyr of Martyrs. By doing so they 
prostituted the martyr tradition to support postwar programs far removed from the American quest 
for either freedom, justice, or humanitarianism.” (153) 
Even in working to explicate abolitionists’ reliance on martyrdom, then, she (and, as I will argue, most if not all 
writers and politicians) relies on its self-evident rhetorical power to ultimately chastise her opponents. I will argue 
later that this is due to martyrology’s fundamentally tautological nature. Interestingly, however, Wolf here outsteps 
nearly fifty years of critics that followed her by elucidating martyrdom’s vulnerability to use as a political weapon or 
ruler (what she calls being “prostituted”).  
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By 1830 they expected martyrs to be men who, like St. Paul, were indifferent, 
prior to sudden conversion, to the truth of the cause for which they later suffered. 
Prospective martyrs, like St. Peter, led ascetic lives either before or immediately 
following their conversion. … Most characteristic of the martyr was his 
willingness, even his intense desire, to suffer persecution and death.” (7) 
These sentences are the most thoroughgoing analysis of the logic of martyrdom in Wolf’s study. 
Though her emphasis on suffering and her analogies are appropriate enough, she makes no 
attempt to explain these connections further or suss out their assumptions. This is the rubric 
against which the rest of her study claims to measure well-known historical figures, and yet 
important questions are left wholly unanswered and even unaddressed: Why is indifference 
before conviction important in a martyr? What does asceticism before a conversion have to do 
with the conversion? How is it that suffering makes a martyr? Most importantly, how are any of 
these qualities, gathered under the umbrella of martyrdom and its logic, supposed to even 
indirectly contribute to the manumission of slaves and the ultimate abolition of slavery in 
America? To put it bluntly, Wolf can insist that American abolitionist martyrs “found spiritual 
significance in tar and feathers,” but she cannot explain how or why they do so; neither does she 
assess the extent to which they imagined themselves successful in converting that significance 
into the abolition of slavery (8). 
Almost without exception, the nineteenth-, twentieth-, and twenty-first-century 
politicians and writers who, like Wolf, describe or appeal to martyrdom in the abolitionist 
movement allow the same omission by avoiding any discussion of the logic of martyrdom 
altogether. As Americans mostly writing for Americans, it is apparently understood that there 
will be no confusion as to what a martyr makes or what a martyr does – the problem is only 
5 
 
reading that status into someone’s life and death, or maybe broadly assessing martyrdom’s 
centrality to different American reform movements that spawned martyrs.2 This could also be 
due to martyrdom’s insistent self-evidence, which makes distinguishing it from other types of 
suffering – victimhood or self-sacrifice or whatever – a little tricky. Even the Oxford English 
Dictionary offers no great help: after delimiting three formats for cataloguing and remembering 
martyrs, the definition’s fourth entry briskly states that martyrology is “an ethos of martyrdom.” 
Against this evidence, though, the concept was born under specific stars: its etymological root is 
the Greek word for "witness" and it proliferated with Christianity to designate those who 
witnessed the divinity of Christ and refused to renounce its truth as the word of God incarnate. 
Martyrs, then, are held by Christianity as models of Christian behavior and reminders of the 
godhood of Christ. The relevant entries in the OED all point to this basic Christian logic of 
martyrdom for the English-speaking world; it is a concept whose power within and without 
Christianity begins in its homology to the model of Jesus and his crucifixion. In other words, the 
martyr’s self-sacrifice is meaningful and instructive insofar as Jesus Christ’s crucifixion is 
meaningful and instructive.  
“Martyrology” can thus refer either to a catalogue of the lives and deaths of religious 
martyrs (like the Book of Martyrs that was popular in early America) or to the logic that makes 
the analogy to Christ possible by transmogrifying a martyr’s life and death into validation and 
instruction. This logic declares that the martyr's suffering unto death for an idea is the ultimate 
expression of his dedication to that idea, thereby validating its truth in the world. Just as the 
ultimate expression of God’s love is that Jesus died for Christians’ sins, so the ultimate 
                                               
2 See the introduction and first chapter of Eyal J. Naveh’s Crown of Thorns: Political Martyrdom in America from 
Abraham Lincoln to Martin Luther King, Jr. for a representational example of this. See nearly any essay length 
study – nineteenth, twentieth, or twenty-first century – on John Brown to see “martyr” used without explanation. My 
epilogue is devoted to this trend specifically. 
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expression of a martyr’s Christ-like righteousness is that he die for Jesus (that the son of God 
rose after death and proved himself the son of God might lend this formulation some of its 
manifest weight; that no martyr ever could is apparently not a problem). Accordingly, 
martyrdom purports to be the ultimate praxis of doxa, the end of devotion whose lesson is that 
the martyr and the thing for which he died are united like Jesus and the Godhead were after the 
crucifixion. This symbolic equation is important because it makes the thing for which the martyr 
suffers just as demonstrably true as the martyr’s personal somatic reality qua suffering. 
Furthermore, it allows martyrology to insist that the suffering body of the martyr’s self-sacrifice 
is actual proof of the credibility and legitimacy of divinity he witnessed and thus attests to the 
veracity of the martyr’s cause. In short, the logic of martyrdom is a dual operation that both 
subjectifies and signifies by analogy to the Christian Church’s Jesus Christ as the central model 
of individuation and cosmic meaning in the western world. In identifying certain abolitionists as 
martyrs, then, the predominantly Protestant rhetoric of abolitionism assumed that the analogy to 
Christ both made the ultimate abolitionist and validated abolitionism at large. 
 If we understand martyrology to be the textual and logical means by which a martyr’s 
willingness to die for a cause becomes proof of the validity of that cause, the most paradigmatic 
and important martyrologies for the English-speaking world are found in sixteenth-century 
England. A look at critical work in the field of Early Modern martyrology thus provides a helpful 
schema for reading the martyrologies on nineteenth-century America. In Martyrdom and 
Literature in Early Modern England, Susannah Monta investigates competing Catholic and 
Protestant martyrologies of this era to parse out their shared assumptions, beliefs, and anxieties. 
She argues that martyrology both creates an interpretive community of believers and must teach 
that community how to interpret martyrs’ sacrifices. The right, martyrological reading can 
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address spiritual ambiguities “by modeling how answers might be found at moments of 
persecutory crisis and then by insisting that the processes which lead martyrs to their answer 
should be followed in readers’ spiritual lives” (14). The result is a community of believers qua 
interpreters who are both fomented and relied upon by martyrologists to apply the right religious 
or ethical meaning to death and then behave with corresponding righteousness in their own lives. 
Importantly, however, Monta also argues that martyrdom is fundamentally tautological insofar as 
it rests on an “epistemological assumption” according to which its audience is required to always 
already be able to recognize and understand the miraculous - they must already possess the truth 
that is plied to persuade them (37). Whereas early modern readers considered martyrs and their 
stories persuasive proof of spiritual or religious legitimacy, Monta argues that this assumption 
makes martyrologies “mostly reflexive or circular confirmations of the causes readers are already 
inclined to endorse” (10). As such they cannot do or say anything new: “[t]his circularity of 
interpretation is both irrefutable ... and also potentially unpersuasive,” especially outside 
martyrology’s epistemic space (like in a secular, republican, slaveholding democracy, for 
example) (38).3 
Like Monta, Mark Breitenberg looks at John Foxe’s enormous Actes and Monuments to 
further elucidate the fundamentally tautological assumptions that hold the logic of martyrdom 
together. In "The Flesh Made Word: Foxe’s ‘Actes and Monuments,’" Breitenberg argues that 
the book's size and its formal convolution (i.e. its varying typographies, multiple editions, 
discursive marginalia, etc.) give it an "iconic" rather than literary presence that "shaped and 
solidified both individual and collective identities" (391). The text’s prolixity and repetition 
                                               
3 However, Monta does “read martyrologies along three major axes of persuasive force: the persuasiveness of 
individual martyrs' claims to adhere to their consciences and inward convictions; the persuasiveness of communities 
of martyrs; and the persuasiveness of material, marvelous, or miraculous testimonies" (11). Without adopting her 
language, my project will be looking at the first two of these axes; the third seems to have considerable less bearing 
on 19th-century America. 
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coagulate like this until "the stories became 'conduct books' on how Protestants should live and 
die," proliferating martyrdom and martyrs in the process (401). According to Breitenberg, the 
profusion of material and forms in the Actes and Monuments functions to connect contemporary 
martyrs to the "original martyrdom of Christ" in a circular logic of mutual validation. John Foxe 
says as much in the "Preface" to the first edition of the Actes and Monuments: addressing Jesus 
Christ directly, Foxe writes, "even if no record of [your martyrs] were to exist here, those whose 
names have been inscribed in the book of your life could not fail to be most illustrious in every 
way." Here, Foxe contends that it is not his book that is illustrative, but martyrdom and martyrs 
themselves, thanks to Jesus, the ur-martyr. To put it broadly, the work of Monta and Breitenberg 
shows that martyrs are considered valuable insofar as they reveal Christ's own self-sacrifice; 
likewise, the model of Christ is the way we recognize and understand martyrdom in the first 
place – we know martyrs are good because they’re like Christ, and we know Christ is good 
thanks to martyrs. By this tendentious logic, martyrdom individuates the martyr and his audience 
as it broadcasts the martyr’s Christian righteousness into the world.4 
Conspicuously, however, martyrology is incapable of explaining the tautology that these 
critics have diagnosed: the space between subjectivity and signifiance, between experience and 
meaning, is therefore not more than a lacuna of indeterminate, vague connection by equation. It 
thus bears more than passing resemblance to what Deleuze and Guattari call an “axiomatic,” or a 
relational law that, despite its own ambitions, is not abstract enough to account for the real.5 In 
other words, martyrdom is an axiom that insists upon the equation of self and meaning without 
reason; though it cannot account for the union, it gives meaning to selfhood and localizable 
                                               
4 My language here is influenced by the philosophical and theoretical work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, 
especially their A Thousand Plateaus. Breitenberg puts a similar idea it in different terms: "In its collation, printing, 
and dissemination, the Actes and Monuments is the catalytic force behind this mutually validating circularity 
between what I have termed 'action' and 'belief'" (400). 
5 Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plateaus, “the axiomatic deals with purely functional elements and 
relations whose nature is not specified” (454).  
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reality to meaning. Incapable of imagining the transmogrification of God's Word from ideal into 
real, it rather puts these things on either side of an equal sign via the copious testimony of 
martyrs and martyrology. I think this is why it’s difficult to pin down the logic of martyrdom and 
overlook it in the first place: because, in Deleuzian terms, it is the axiomatic (or perhaps one of 
many) that imbricates signifiance and signification into the semiotic mix of the English-speaking 
word from early modernity on, martyrdom is both foundational enough to be invisible to the 
critics discussed above and diffuse enough to undergird diverse manifestations. Indeed, as 
Deleuze and Guattari say of the capitalist axiomatic, the rubric of martyrdom both results in 
isomorphy and produces heterogeneity, thereby easily slipping into the bases of highly diverse 
domains. 
 Perhaps this begins to explain the sheer enormity of Foxe’s Actes and Monuments: the 
book's huge number of variegated examples of martyrs across more than 2000 pages wants to 
develop a more profuse and therefore purportedly truer stronghold of martyrdom. Again, this 
"therefore" is only possible thanks to the (tauto)logic of martyrdom, which allows the union of 
signifiance and subjectification whereby the proliferation of examples validates the examples’ 
isomorphy, which in turn proliferates examples, etc. The lesson and model of each martyr’s 
testimony is predictable and redundant not despite the proliferation and diversity of 
martyrological examples, but rather because the text’s discursive profusion is always “allow[ed] 
and even incite[d]” by its isomorphy (Deleuze 436). The Actes and Monuments is famously far 
from homogenous: critics have routinely wrestled with its enormous volume of different genres, 
typographies, voices, and sources, the preponderance of which, Breitenberg argues, "persuade[s] 
by leaving little space for an alternative" (391). The copious bricolage of the text creates what he 
calls a “dialogical structure” that “appears to extend beyond the textual boundaries to include the 
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large number of those who came in contact with the book” (390, 391). And yet, even as Foxe 
relies on copious heterogeneity, Breitenberg shows that he also “does not think in pluralistic 
terms" insofar as there is a magisterial, teleological unity to his diverse efforts (395). Thus, the 
singularity of his Christian model is bolstered by the variety of support given for the model; that 
is, because the axiomatic that subtends martyrology endorses the mutual validation of the 
isomorphy of martyrdom and the heterogeneity of its manifestation, more of one makes more of 
the other and a huge, discursive book can seem like nigh on irrefutable proof. 
 Other critics have continued the work of examining, analyzing, and deconstructing the 
martyrologies of sixteenth-century England and their impact on theology, literature, and politics. 
This work is important to the study of nineteenth-century American martyrdom not only because 
early America inherited so much of English culture, but also because similar work has not been 
explored extensively in American Studies, despite the prominence of martyrdom in antebellum 
discourse especially. Of particular importance to this project is Thomas S. Freeman’s exploration 
of martyrdom’s impact on politics in “‘Imitatio Christi with a Vengeance’: The Politicization of 
Martyrdom in Early Modern England,” which argues that the Christ-like martyr was 
“particularly well suited to the English experience,” as its focus on suffering and humiliation was 
mutually venerated by Catholics and Protestants (59).6 He avers that this paradigm “facilitated, 
perhaps even made possible, the most important shift in early-modern martyrdom: the 
politicisation of the martyr” and the ultimate “secularization of martyrdom” (57, 64). By glossing 
this shift and the thinking that made it possible, Freeman persuasively contends that martyrdom 
has become unmoored from the source of its original sense. Within the epistemic space of 
                                               
6 Freeman lists many types of martyrs that proliferated in the medieval era: miles Christi as the knight of God, the 
ascetic martyr, the contemplative martyr, the innocent victim of lethal violence, and the virgin martyr (52). He 
argues, however, that by the sixteenth century the Christ-like martyr, who suffers for Godly truth like Jesus did, 
gained prominence in England and eventually the entire “English-speaking world” (59). 
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Christian doctrine and belief, martyrdom is safely a matter of faith; that is, faith in the 
eschatological implications of Jesus Christ’s resurrection can solve the problem of martyrdom’s 
tautology and thereby speak to anxieties regarding right behavior and Calvinist election. 
However, by the nineteenth century (and certainly by the twentieth) in America and England, the 
logic of martyrdom begins to reach outside Christianity to influence the purportedly secular 
sphere of politics, where one cannot rely on the Gospel to make sense of it.7  
Nineteenth-century American writers were often aware of martyrdom’s provenance in 
medieval Europe and sixteenth-century England and in fact relied upon it to substantiate their 
arguments as potentially persuasive. For example, George B. Cheever’s “The Martyr’s Death 
and the Martyr’s Triumph,” delivered just two days after John Brown’s hanging, suggests that 
“John Foxe’s Book of Martyrs being opened before us, you might almost think a score of pages 
had been taken from it to be rehearsed in Charleston” (Redpath 227). In this sermon for Brown, 
Cheever refers to the Old Man repeatedly as a “Christian hero” who “has thrown himself into 
this conflict a martyr even unto death” (Redpath 215). Here, it’s clear that Cheever considers 
Brown’s whole life to be meaningfully martyrological; accordingly, his death is just the 
apotheosis of a life’s worth of experiential meaning. Cheever thinks that the whole thing literally 
comes from God, explaining that “God evidently prepared the man, by many years of discipline 
… for such a protest, for such a work,” all according to His larger plan (218). And though 
Cheever makes of John Brown and the raid “a sublime and solitary instance in all modern 
history,” he also starts his argument by connecting Brown’s life to the lives of his forebears, 
namely the pilgrims who (according to Cheever) disobeyed England in the pursuit of justice and 
                                               
7 Freeman’s contribution is vital and thoroughgoing, but he steps up to this problem without addressing it; in fact, 
despite the logical shortcomings of martyrology as he names them, Freeman seems to relish in the logic’s power 
outside Christian discourse, ending the chapter by saying of political martyrs, “If you were willing to lose your life, 
you might gain the whole world thereby” (69). In this sense, Freeman is representative of American and English 
writers and politicians who point to or rely on the logic of martyrdom in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first 
centuries (at least) without exploring its conceptualization.  
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new land (213). Their lives were meaningful like Brown’s, regardless of the latter’s self-
sacrificial death, because “Out of the righteous disobedience of unrighteous law grew that 
constitution of a righteous liberty” that became America (223, 213). Like Freeman, Cheever 
recognizes the connection between historical, Protestant martyrdom and nineteenth-century 
American abolitionism insofar as he assumes that they are a unitary historical force for justice. 
Spanning the gap between puritanism and abolitionism is the equal sign of Brown’s biography. 
That is, Cheever’s martyrological thinking equates Brown’s life (including his Puritan history), 
his death (specifically in opposition to the state), and God’s higher plan; the implication is that 
the union of these three things proves the righteousness of abolitionism.  
In the sections that follow, I hope to show that not all nineteenth-century American 
martyrologists were so confident in martyrdom’s potential. Rather, the negotiations and often 
strident redundancy of writers like John Brown (especially via his martyrologist, James Redpath) 
and Harriet Beecher Stowe belie an anxiety that seems to recognize the limits of martyrdom as 
social action, even as the use martyrdom to equate Christian righteousness with the abolition of 
slavery. Whereas the brilliant rhetorical strategies of Frederick Douglass also engage abolitionist 
martyrdom, he diverges from other martyrologists by relying on its logic not to persuade to 
convert his audience, but rather to provoke them. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
“WORTH INCONCEIVABLY MORE TO HANG THAN ANY OTHER PURPOSE:” JOHN 
BROWN AND MARTYRDOM 
 
John Brown was hanged on December 2nd, 1859 in Charleston, Virginia for leading a 
violent assault on the federal armory at Harper’s Ferry with a racially mixed band of freemen and 
slaves. The Old Man had been a militant abolitionist since at least 1855, when he participated in 
the Wakarusa War in Lawrence, Kansas; later, in 1856, he became a minor celebrity for leading 
the violent abduction and murder of five purportedly pro-slavery Kansans.8 In the last few years 
of his life, in fact, Brown was consistently radical, though not consistently violent, in his 
insistence on racial equality and his actions against slavery.9 However, his failed raid in Virginia 
and subsequent hanging quickly vaulted him into national public consciousness where he was 
used to symbolize different things for different people. Opinions were had by all: Lincoln, 
Emerson, Thoreau, Melville, Victor Hugo, William D. Howells, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and 
basically all the Beechers and all the Alcotts had something to say amidst the general public 
outcry. Though their responses were formally varied (speeches, polemics, poems, paintings, 
elegies, biographies, etc.), they largely argue from one of only two positions: John Brown is a 
martyr and exemplar as well as a disconcerting portent of unnecessary violence borne of 
America’s inhumane treatment of blacks; or John Brown is a treasonous murderer as well as a 
premonitory instance of unnecessary violence let loose by the federal government’s indecision 
on the slavery issue. This rigid dichotomy of interpretation ran along an already stratified 
dialectic that pitted abolitionism against pro-slavery and whiteness against blackness; as such, it 
                                               
8 See Reynolds, John Brown: Abolitionist, pp. 138-174, passim.  
9 Reynolds is at pains throughout John Brown to show that the Old Man was radical through much of his adulthood. 
Accordingly, he makes extensive use of Brown’s League of Gileadites, his replacement American Constitution, his 
interest in American maroon, the eleven slaves he freed in 1857, and his family’s residency in the black community 
of North Elba. 
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intensified the already explosive geographical, political, cultural, economic, and racial binary 
oppositions of the day. 
Importantly, however, David S. Reynolds’s authoritative biography argues that the 
process of turning Brown into a biunivocal symbol took time and effort. Reynolds writes that, 
thanks to misinformation both deliberate and otherwise, the “earliest response to the takeover of 
Harper’s Ferry was confusion,” most of which was overwhelmingly negative both locally and 
nationally (335). Newspapers reported wildly divergent statistics regarding Brown’s military 
force and the number of casualties on both sides; journalists’ distortion and exaggeration of facts 
was exacerbated by the South’s (and especially vengeful Virginia’s) efforts to make Brown’s 
raid emblematic of Northern abolitionist aggression at large. Before identifying him as a martyr, 
then, the North - including most of his backers, the so-called “Secret Six,” as well as well-known 
abolitionist reformers like William Lloyd Garrison and Horace Greeley - was first interested in 
distancing their brand(s) of abolitionism from Brown’s violent radicalism. Reynolds argues that 
this kind of stiff-arming would have buried Brown as a “curious anomaly of history” had it not 
been for the quick response of Transcendentalists, “who rescued him from infamy and possible 
oblivion” (344). Specifically, Reynolds credits Ralph Waldo Emerson, who gave the lecture 
“Courage” in Boston on November 8th, 1859, wherein argued that Brown was a “new saint 
awaiting his martyrdom, and who, if he shall suffer, will make the gallows glorious like the 
cross” (qtd. in Reynolds 366). According to Reynolds, “When aired publicly by Emerson, the 
‘gallows glorious’ phrase sped through newspapers North and South like a ricocheting bullet. It 
outraged Brown’s opponents and inspired his supporters. It was the most polarizing statement 
made about John Brown” (367). Emerson’s statements and those of others, whether in Brown’s 
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favor or not, helped to adhere and congeal disparate movements for and against slavery in both 
the North and the South. 
Of course, John Brown also martyrized himself by explicitly comparing himself to Christ 
in letters and in court.10 Brown’s spoken and written words, published by both pro- and anti-
slavery newspapers, often aimed to console his family and supporters and encourage the 
abolitionist’s crime. He said repeatedly and in various ways that he was “worth inconceivably 
more to hang than to any other purpose” and quoted sixteenth-century martyr John Rogers to his 
family. Such allusions to Christ and other martyrs suggests that Brown was thinking about the 
Book of Martyrs in composing his letters; the abridged version of John Foxe’s Actes and 
Monuments and its tradition likely also taught him to comport himself with a martyr’s calm 
whereby he grew close with his jailer and accepted virtually all visitors except Southern priests 
and preachers who wanted Brown to repent. Reynolds echoes the sentiment of the Old Man’s 
supporters when he writes, “Brown had lived to talk, to write, and to be hanged. It was for this 
reason more than any other that he influenced American history” (334). It is clear that 
Reynolds’s conception and understanding of American history parallels Brown’s insofar as they 
both recognize martyrdom and its logic to be a life vest able to save a martyr from obscurity, 
making it a (self-consciously) potent vehicle of social change.  
Here, I should emphasize that John Brown’s martyrologists could only proclaim him as a 
martyr by insisting that he died for his belief in abolitionism rather than his violent assault on the 
state, which, to put it bluntly, is not the case. Brown was tried and hanged by the state of 
Virginia for three offences (none of which were abolitionism as a cause): treason against 
Virginia (despite his lack of citizenship there), multiple charges of first-degree murder, and 
                                               
10 According to Thomas Freeman, self martyrization is typical of martyrs at large, for “The chief agents in 
comparing the martyrs to Christ were often the martyrs themselves” (48). 
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inciting a slave-rebellion. In text and at the pulpit, pro-Brown abolitionists engaged only the third 
charge and extrapolated it John Brown could be imaged as symbolizing abolitionism; they did so 
by martyrizing him to the cause, arguing that his willingness to die for the manumission of slaves 
proves the righteous validity of that cause. This is to say that the cost of martyrizing John Brown 
is the memory of his other offenses, or his strategic (if baffling and extreme) methods of 
transgressing against the state, including his revolt against the state’s monopoly on violence, his 
highly unsymbolic hopes of victory by guerrilla warfare in the years leading up to the raid, and 
the extremism of his racial egalitarianism.11 As Ted Smith argues in Weird John Brown: Divine 
Violence and the Limits of Ethics, “Brown and his contemporaries were writing his life into 
larger historical visions even before his death. The most triumphal narratives scarcely 
acknowledged his death at all” – this importantly includes the violence Brown brought upon 
others as well as that brought upon him by the state (163). Ultimately, and despite Reynolds’ 
laudable efforts in John Brown, it would seem that the images of John Brown as a freedom 
fighter in life and John Brown as a martyr in death are mutually exclusive. 
Regardless, it’s not surprising that the martyrization of John Brown is largely 
homologous to the martyrologies of sixteenth-century England insofar as they both overtly rely 
on the same type of copious tautology to insistently construct martrydom. Again, this martyrdom 
is not just the martyr’s willingness to die for abolitionism, but the conceptualization that 
imagines the martyr’s death as somehow (tautologically, as I have argued) validating their belief 
at large. After the initial farrago of praise and condemnation that exploded in October of 1859, 
earnest martyrization in the North started in November of 1859 and continued throughout 1860 
as Transcendentalists, preachers, and politicians began to overtly define Brown as the paragon 
                                               
11 See Reynolds’s chapter “The Plan” in John Brown for a circumspect defense of Brown’s intentions, including his 
Constitution, his thorough research on guerrilla warfare, and his efforts to conscript allies financial and militant.  
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abolitionist martyr.12 One of these writers was James Redpath, a Scottish immigrant, outspoken 
Chartist, and correspondent for the New-York Tribune, who was close with the Brown family 
(which included Brown’s twenty children by two different wives), and may have been part of 
Brown’s crew in Bleeding Kansas. He looked forward to Brown’s death so he could publish the 
radical’s first biography, which some critics think he may have even started while his friend was 
still alive (Finkelman 45). Concurrently, Redpath was the first to anthologize pro-Brown 
testimonies and sentiments in the collection Echoes of Harper’s Ferry, which includes nearly 
one hundred speeches, sermons, letters, and poems about, to, and even by John Brown across 
more than five hundred pages. Almost without exception, these pieces compare Brown to Christ 
and credit him for following the higher law of God’s will. If the individual units of Echoes often 
make this comparison explicitly, the book’s organization also does so implicitly, raising it nearly 
to the level of typology: some of the titles of its sections include “Bunker Hill,” “Mount Sinai,” 
and, most provocatively, “Death of Samson.”13 It goes without saying, however, that this 
comparison on both the book’s larger organizational scale and the smaller scale of its individual 
pieces is only valid insofar as Christ is made to be an abolitionist. Thus, if Brown is like Christ 
because Christ is like Brown, Echoes operates within the same preponderance of circular logic 
that critics like Monta and Breitenberg have diagnosed in sixteenth-century martyrologies. 
 This preponderance overwhelmingly consists of the details of Brown’s life, or, more 
accurately, whatever bits of his life can be easily shown to have been targeting slavery. Such 
                                               
12 Specifically, Reynolds argues, "November 18, 1859, may be identified as the day when the roiling attitudes 
toward Brown separated into two main streams, one leading toward a primarily negative view of him and the other 
toward a primarily positive one" insofar as the New York Vigilant Committee held an anti-Brown convention 
(pushing the “Brown-Republican” conspiracy) at the same time as a pro-Brown rally was held at Tremont Temple 
(pushing the image of Brown as a martyr) (367). 
13
 In Weird John Brown, Ted Smith notices a trend in pro-Brown writings of comparing him to Samson, even 
mentioning that “Brown himself used the story to interpret the significance of his death” (164). He finds this 
preferable to the more straightforward martyrization by the likes of Thoreau and Emerson in that “The Samson story 
could … even acknowledge Brown’s mistakes” as well as “a much stronger sense of the sovereignty of a personal 
God” (165). 
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biographical data is redundant and often dubious but can be found in everything from Redpath’s 
encomiastic biography John Brown to the individual entries he collected in Echoes. Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s short eulogy of Brown is representative when it says, “I mean, in the few remarks I 
have to make, to cling to his history, or let him speak for himself," after which he proceeds to 
give yet another abridged biography of Brown (119). Even in the shortest responses to Brown’s 
death, the story of his lived experience is presented as inseparable from the isomorphy of 
martyrdom that his life apparently obtains. Henry David Thoreau says early in his “A Plea for 
Captain John Brown” that the man was “old-fashioned … in his respect for the Constitution, and 
his faith in the permanence of this Union. Slavery he deemed to be wholly opposed to these, and 
he was its determined foe” both in life and in death (Redpath 18). Like Emerson’s, Cheever’s, 
and others’, Thoreau’s response is largely a biography of Brown rather than a defense of his raid 
and its violence or an explication of his achievement.  
Of course, this rhetorical maneuver has the definite advantage of avoiding the 
uncomfortable truth of Brown’s extremism and its possible indefensibility, as briefly discussed 
above. This was especially important in that these writers and speakers martyrized Brown before 
an increasingly uneasy antebellum America that was probably squeamish about the violent 
catastrophe imminent in 1859. In any case, my point is that the adequation of life, death, and 
politico-religious cause is only possible within the logic that has experience mean self-evidently, 
which is to say it is only possible thanks to martyrology. In other words, abolitionist writers 
make John Brown’s life and death - or, in their hands, his martyrdom - into an equal sign that 
unites Christianity and abolitionism, thereby mutually validating the righteousness of both. If 
their strident redundancy suggests that they recognize and want to overcome the rhetorical 
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limitations of this strategy, it also reveals their hope that its rhetorical use will convert readers to 
abolitionism, or at least a more intense abolitionist stance. 
Redpath’s writerly contribution to Echoes comes in the form of polemical introductions, 
wherein he overtly imagines Brown’s martyrdom and its martyrology to have the power of 
persuasion. Accordingly, if surprisingly, the entirety of Echoes is dedicated to General Fabre 
Geffrard, the president of the “Republic of Hayti,” because, according to Redpath, the pieces 
inside “mark the commencement of a new and more radically earnest crusade against the crime 
of the South, and the curse and disgrace of the Union,” i.e. slavery (4). In this regard, Echoes 
first appears to be an abolitionist missive from Redpath to Geffrard whereby Redpath is equating 
his own literary contribution with Geffrard’s military accomplishment in recently free Haiti (he 
even mentions that he suffered “no little labor” putting the volume together, implying that he 
maybe deserves a little bit of the martyrization that’s going around) (8). However, Redpath goes 
on in his preface to state that his anthology exists, “first, to preserve, in a permanent form, the 
memorable words that have been spoken of Captain John Brown; and, second, to aid the families 
of the blacks and the men of color, who recently went to Heaven via Harper’s Ferry” (5). In this 
sense, Redpath clearly imagines these two reasons as interdependent on one another: Brown’s 
words are memorable because they aid black families who sacrificed themselves and thereby 
made Brown’s words memorable, etc. One makes more of the other, the proliferation of which, 
according to Redpath and his martyrologic, will apparently have the power to persuade General 
Geffrard, though it’s not clear what he thinks will be the result (besides, maybe, more abolitionist 
martyrdom). At the first stages of its development, then, Redpath imagines martyrdom and its 
logic as being not only indicative of commitment and validation of a righteous cause but also 
persuasive of conversion on behalf of that cause. 
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 Perhaps paradoxically, but not at all unlike Actes and Monuments, Redpath’s anthology is 
a bricolage of formal variety and redundancy (including rampant plagiarism14) that doesn’t argue 
for John Brown’s martyr status as validation of abolitionism so much as it assumes its 
indisputability and self-evidence. A large part of the book is full of letters to and from John 
Brown written during the forty days of his pre-execution imprisonment. These letters are the real 
birthplace of John Brown’s legacy – though he was already infamous before 1859, and though 
the Associated Press and Redpath were responsible for disseminating the letters, critics agree that 
it was largely John Brown who martyrized himself via his sympathizers’ correspondence before 
his death.15 Like John Foxe’s “Actes and Monuments,” Echoes of Harper’s Ferry presents 
examples of pro-Brown support in a dialogical structure that invites readers into a community of 
believers who always praise, thank, and compare Brown to Christ.16 It accordingly imagines 
itself as persuasive insofar as it invites readers into a martyrological, interpretive community; as 
Redpath says, Brown’s raid “has elicited from every free man an expression of his opinion on 
American Slavery” presumably because it “induced thousands to investigate their duties to the 
Union and the Slave” (4, 457). This expression is made univocally pro-Brown by Redpath’s 
anthology, which dedicates a whole section to letters to and from Brown. According to Redpath, 
these letters are “interesting evidences” that may persuade General Fabre because they “indicate 
                                               
14 Paul Finkelman writes, “Redpath’s description [of Brown’s hanging] came, word for word, from the Tribune (but 
without attribution or quotation marks). … This was clearly fiction designed to create myth” (51). Furthermore, 
Redpath’s “Appendix” is the reprinted “articles on the North and South, or the cost of the union,” from the New-
York Tribune, though he does properly cite his source in this case (458). I would add to Finkelman’s assessment that 
Redpath was a professional writer who could have written the myth in his own words. What’s more important is that 
he wanted to intensify an already proliferating myth by piling on heterogeneous iterations of its telling, so he 
zealously stole, borrowed, and modified every version he could find. 
15 See, for example, Eyal Naveh’s “John Brown and the Legacy of Martyrdom” and Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s “’A 
Volcano beneath a Mountain of Snow:’ John Brown and the Problem of Interpretation.” 
16 Indeed, the similarity between these otherwise very different martyrologies is strong enough that some of 
Breitenberg’s conclusions seem to apply to both: for example, they seek “to produce and reproduce an extensive 
Protestant network by profusely reprinting letters, conversations, examinations, and orally transmitted narratives. 
This dialogical structure serves to incorporate readers and hearers of the book as members of an extensive Protestant 
community” (390). 
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more clearly the sentiment of the people than any other utterances that the old man’s glorious act 
called forth,” including Redpath’s own (387). In Redpath’s fantasy of persuasion, then, Brown’s 
martyrdom and the responses it inspired are equated; the deed and its analysis are made to be 
equally important and thus a single whole. According to Echoes of Harper’s Ferry, John 
Brown’s martyrdom is persuasive of conversion because it is not just his self-sacrifice, but the 
entire heterogeneous assemblage of his death, including the raid itself and the profusion of 
interpretation that gave it meaning. 
 Nearly every eulogy and celebration of Brown in both the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries relies on this rhetorical maneuver by which select details of the martyr’s life, not 
limited to the circumstances that lead to his death, contribute to the meaning writers make of the 
whole (it’s probably the case that this is common to all eulogies, or to some degree fundamental 
to the form). Their tone is often sanctimonious and more than a little glozing, as if they know 
they are complicit in making something of Brown and his raid and that they’re doing so by 
equating the Old Man’s life with his death and with general Christian morality qua abolitionism. 
In fact, Redpath says as much in the introduction to Echoes of Harper’s Ferry: “The Beechers of 
our age [i.e., politicians and speechmakers] are only useful in proportion as they prepare the way 
for the John Browns [i.e., actors and martyrs]” (6). In other words, it is both the martyr and his 
community of believers cum analysts that make martyrdom effective in equating subjectivity and 
signifiance. And while Brown’s self-sacrifice is made to be the ultimate expression of his 
dedication to abolition, it is specifically the dialogical structure of Brown-themed speeches, 
sermons, and letters that reach out from the particularity of his life and death, inviting readers 
and witnesses to learn from his devotion. The logic here says that a witness can be a martyr 
because martyrdom unto death is different from more common experience not in kind but only in 
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degree. And the lesson is always the same: the end of devotion may be death, but less than death 
isn’t nothing and all experience has or is meaning.  
 It is by this martyrologic that Brown could imagine that he was “worth inconceivably 
more to hang than for any other purpose.” That is, the interpretive community fomented by his 
martyrdom can be imagined to be more effective than paramilitary aggression precisely because 
it reveals, models, and even encourages a type of abolitionist participation for the audience left in 
Brown’s wake. This particular strategy is not one of egalitarianism, anarchy, violence, or 
insurrection, but rather of empathic suffering that will somehow engender more anti-slavery 
sentiment while intensifying that which already exists. Accordingly, I will argue in the next 
section that the martyrization of John Brown has much in common with the sentimental 
abolitionism of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Although the violent radicalism of 
Brown’s martyrdom has discouraged critics from comparing it to Stowe’s social action of 
domesticity and feeling, a look at the conceptualization of martyrdom in the nineteenth century’s 
most successful novel shows that Stowe relies on the same strategies used by Foxe, Brown, and 
Redpath to reap successful abolitionism from the deaths of Eva and Tom. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“I CAN DIE!:” ABOLITIONIST MARTYRDOM IN UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 
Martyrdom is the heart of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which tries to imagine the end of slavery 
by a process of suffering and empathy that includes its audience. Many of the plots and 
characters of the novel follow a path from empathy to abolitionist martyrdom whereby the 
individual suffering of martyrs ultimately leads to the manumission of slaves. Stowe’s narrator 
calls this “the victory without the battle,--the crown without the conflict” and clearly imagines 
martyrdom as a surefire if still complicated solution to both slavery and the imminent sectarian 
violence of antebellum America (429). Perhaps more importantly, though, the drama of Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin develops according to this logic (including “The Martyr,” a chapter wherein the 
narrative voice is dedicated to ensuring the martyrological status of its eponymous character) 
without ever overtly recognizing its limits. The novel’s narrative voice insists that martyrdom 
makes for effective abolitionism insofar as it is the most christic option, but does not explain 
how this can be the case; in other words, despite the novel’s didacticism, it simply does not 
explain how “right feeling” unto death can manumit black slaves without violence or conflict. 
Rather, its famous sentimentalism relies on the logic of martyrdom to assume that “Christ-
like[ness]” can impact the eschatological condition of America, if not humanity at large.  
 As Eva nears her death, she says to Uncle Tom, “I would be glad to die, if my dying 
would stop all this misery. I would die for [the slaves], Tom, if I could” (401). Of course, Eva 
unambiguously gets what she wants in that she does die less than thirty pages later. However, her 
success in “stopping all this misery” remains ambiguous insofar as Eva’s death seems to cause 
quite a bit of misery at St. Clare’s plantation. Additionally, Eva’s use of the subjunctive case in 
this passage (“If I could”) seems to belie some anxiety as to the real abolitionist potential of 
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death. The novel attempts to mitigate this concern by grafting a well-worn lesson onto Eva: it 
compares her life and death to that of Jesus Christ so that both the narrator and Eva herself can 
appeal to the theology of resurrection and atonement that grants freedom in eternal life for all 
good Christians. Eva says to Tom that she “can understand why Jesus wanted to die for us” 
because “[she has] felt so, too,” implying that she would put her death towards abolitionism if it 
would mean commanding the divine power by which Jesus’s death had an impact on the 
eschatological condition of human beings (400). In other words, just as Christ’s death freed 
Christians from original sin, Eva would have her death free black slaves from chattel slavery. In 
this regard, Harriet Beecher Stowe is performing as a novelistic martyrologist who makes Eva 
into a “contemplative martyr,” or one whose martyrdom is “compassionate suffering with 
Christ” (Piroyansky 71). Furthermore, she does so in order to reap abolitionism from the young 
girl’s otherwise insipidly meaningless death.  
 It goes without saying that this comparison of Eva St. Clare to Jesus of Nazareth ignores 
the many ways that these two figures widely differ (in gender, race, age, era, region, religion, 
language, socioeconomic status, divinity, etc.) so as to emphasize the one thing they do have in 
common: they both empathically suffer for others, especially the lowly. When Miss Ophelia says 
that Eva is “so loving! … she’s no more than Christ-like,” she is referring to this shared suffering 
even as she restricts it to an emotional state that effaces the singular life and bodily suffering 
Jesus experienced according to the Gospel (411). This is characteristic of Uncle Tom’s Cabin’s 
larger project, which is obsessed with emotional feeling; the novel famously insists that its 
readers need to “feel right” because “the man or woman who feels strongly, healthily and justly, 
on the great interests of humanity, is a constant benefactor to the human race” (624). Christ-
likeness is then explicitly underwritten as Stowe moves from this adjuration of right feeling 
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immediately to the model of Jesus to ask her readers, “Are [your sympathies] in harmony with 
the sympathies of Christ?” (624). The right feeling, then, is a “Christ-like” feeling, which is to 
say empathic suffering that somehow begets abolition.17 
 “Christ-like” Eva is the model for this type of emotional abolitionism. She moves into 
this position from her deathbed, which Fisher argues is the site at which sentimentalism 
privileges emotion and passivity, or where “Tears become more important than escapes or 
rescues” (110). From this powerfully sentimental position, Eva becomes a gently pedantic leader 
of her family’s “people,” imploring them to live more Christian lives. Eva’s reasoning here is 
convoluted: because she empathically suffers for the vicissitudes of slavery (here meaning 
specifically the slaves’ dependence, poverty, and especially the illiteracy that prevents them from 
reading the Bible), she loves the slaves and they love her in return; because they love one 
another, they want to be together in eternal life; finally, good Christian living on both their parts 
is the only guarantor of eternal life and the unity that the church promises.18 The slaves respond 
powerfully to Eva, falling “on their knees” as if to worship her (she is their model just as Christ 
is her model) and praying “after the manner of their susceptible race” (419). Immediately 
thereafter, Miss Ophelia clears the room and the novel follows Tom away from the St. Clares’, 
but, judging by Topsy’s and even Augustine’s subsequent conversions (or desire for conversion, 
in the latter’s case), it is apparent that Eva’s empathic suffering lends her the powerful status of a 
                                               
17 This is different and more specific than what the novel thinks of being Christian, which can mean a great number 
of things: being trustworthy (to Tom), trusting in God (to St. Clare), obeying a master (to Eliza, at least early in the 
novel), helping dependents (to Mrs. Shelby), abolitionism (to Mrs. Bird), and not living an “idle, careless, 
thoughtless” life (to Eva), inter alia. My point here is that while Christianity and being Christian are expansive, 
multivalent, and complicated in Uncle Tom’s Cabin (too much so, at least, for the space of this paper), being 
“Christ-like” is relatively simple and univocal in its equation with empathic suffering. 
18 Thus, she basically performs what Fisher describes: “deathbed loss is the only common experience that the white 
reader has that Stowe can use to comprehend slavery as separation, as the loss of members of a family who, like 
Uncle Tom, expect or hope for reunion just as the Christian reader does for his loved ones in heaven” (109). What 
Fisher calls sentimental here I want to say is even more fundamentally martyrological. 
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martyr, which in turn grants her moral centrality and sway over a formerly uncontrollable and 
“shiftless” cohort.  
 The consequences of the girl’s death at the St. Clare compound are symptomatic of her 
larger-scale success: namely, Eva martyrologically combats slavery by building a community of 
anti-slavery sentiment whose bonds are tied by empathic feeling. Her life and death are like an 
addendum to St. Clare’s diagnosis of the problem with fighting slavery: though it may be the 
case that “[o]ne man can do nothing, against the whole action of a community,” Eva shows that 
it is also the case that one man (or one little girl) can empathize with the victims of slavery in 
order to foment a community that is antithetical to the pro-slavery community in its Christ-
likeness, which is somehow the only quality equal to the task (394).19 Eva’s martyrdom 
transforms St. Clare’s slaves from a “shambling, loose, [and] untaught” mob into a purposeful 
community that recognizes the evil that is slavery and who fights it by suffering (316).20 It is thus 
martyrdom and, more precisely, the logic of martyrdom that allows Stowe’s sentimentalism to 
imagine effecting change on a political or national (if not eschatological) level.  
Chapter forty of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, “The Martyr,” is conspicuously if unsurprisingly 
similar in structure to Eva’s plot in that it demonstrates martyrology’s salvific potential in Tom’s 
death. This chapter describes Legree’s decision to torture information from Tom regarding the 
escape of Cassy and Emmeline or else kill him in the process (which is ultimately what he wants 
to do and what he does). Of course, Tom does not reveal what he knows and instead protects the 
                                               
19 The novel simply assumes that this is the case but Jane Tompkins explains in “Sentimental Power: Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin and the Politics of Literary History” that the Stowe’s book was popular because of a “relationship of these 
scenes to a pervasive cultural myth which invests the suffering and death of an innocent victim with just the kind of 
power that critics deny Stowe’s novel: the power to work in, and change, the world” (130). I would add that this is 
possible thanks to the social and cultural capital of martyrdom in the English-speaking world, the influence of which 
is explored in Thomas Freeman’s “‘Imitatio Christi with a Vengeance’: The Politicization of Martyrdom in Early 
Modern England.” 
20  There are many communities in Uncle Tom’s Cabin (the North, St. Clare’s slaves, pro-slavery Americans, and 
others are described as different communities), but only those constituted by strong empathic suffering provide a 
glimpse of a positive post-slavery future. 
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fleeing women with his body, which is violently abused throughout the chapter. When Tom says 
to Legree, “I can’t tell anything. I can die!,” he concurs with Eva (and Stowe) in insisting that he 
can martyrize himself in order to manumit slaves: he adequates death with liberty for himself and 
the free slaves he protects. Still more, it quickly becomes apparent that he can also die for 
Legree: “if taking every drop of blood in this poor old body would save your precious soul, I’d 
give ‘em freely, as the Lord gave his for me” (582).21 This explicit self-comparison to Christ 
only almost works on Legree, who apparently can’t be saved, but Tom’s piteous martyrological 
and somatic condition successfully converts the “imbruted” Quimbo and Sambo, who begin to 
feel for Tom’s suffering and regret their part in it.22 Like Eva, Tom’s likeness to Christ is 
reduced here to his emotional and spiritual condition, despite the fact that (unlike Eva’s) Tom’s 
tortured body bears quite a bit of similarity with Christ’s as he died on the cross. Once again, 
then, Stowe’s sentimentalism is martyrological and martyrdom is abolitionist in Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin insofar as they produce specifically empathic Christian communities that can loosen 
slavery’s hold on the nation by imitating the martyr that inspired them. 
 From its sentimentalism to its waxing didactic, Uncle Tom’s Cabin seems to hope that it 
can build similar bonds between itself and its readership, thereby extrapolating Eva’s success and 
further intensifying abolitionism and right feeling. Accordingly, Ophelia’s description of Eva as 
“no more than Christ-like,” in addition to being one of similitude as discussed above, can 
conversely be read as a recognition of Eva’s eschatological impotence, her being nothing more 
than like Christ but not actually christic. By this reading, Ophelia is not so much judging Eva as 
                                               
21  After this, the text makes explicit what was implicit in Eva’s story, i.e. Christ’s centrality as model and analogy 
for these characters’ success: “But, of old, there was One whose suffering changed an instrument of torture, 
degradation and shame, into a symbol of glory, honor, and immortal life; and, where His spirit is, neither degrading 
stripes, nor blood, nor insults, can make the Christian’s last struggle less than glorious” (583). 
22 As Danna Piroyansky explains in “‘Thus May a Man be a Martyr:’ The Notion, Language, and Experience of 
Martyrdom in Late Medieval England,” “By imitating Christ’s suffering, or experiencing it with him or for him, 
these writers expose their love, so that ‘the distance between oneself and the suffering Christ’ could diminish” (73).  
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she is veiling the girl’s Christian morality in a simple righteousness akin to common sense, as if 
martyrdom were easily accessible not just to Eva but to any good Christian with empathy. 
Ophelia thus minimizes Eva’s achievement in suffering but does so without attenuating the 
potential of her abolitionist influence on the St. Clare plantation. On the contrary, in 
conceptualizing Eva’s Christ-likeness into common decency, Stowe dilates the scope of Eva’s 
impact by making abolitionist martyrdom possible for any empathic Christian. This gesture 
makes abolitionism accessible to all Christian readers of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. In other words, the 
lesson pushed by John Brown’s martyrization is identical to that pushed by Stowe’s 
martyrological sentimentalism: if empathic suffering is all it takes to be as righteous a 
revolutionary as Jesus Christ, then successful abolitionism in antebellum America only requires 
Stowe’s audience (synecdochal for America at large) to feel right.23 
Insofar as martyrology is the logic that can imagine suffering as able to effect political 
and social change, it also apparently fundamental to the political and literary project of 
nineteenth-century American sentimentalism. Indeed, Philip Fisher sounds a lot like a good critic 
of martyrology when he argues in the seminal Hard Facts that “sentimentality” is radically 
democratic because it relies on empathy to extend humanity to a class that “achieves, or rather 
earns, the right to human regard by means of the reality of their suffering” (99). For Fisher, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin implies that suffering itself can liberate slaves by 
humanizing them and consequently inspiring the unenslaved to unshackle the slaves’ chains. If 
this is the case, Uncle Tom’s Cabin is participating in the martyrological tradition wherein the 
lives and suffering deaths of martyrs are made to attest to the righteous veracity of the martyr’s 
                                               
23 Or, as Tompkins puts it, Uncle Tom’s Cabin “reaches out into the reader’s world and colonizes it for its own 
eschatology: that is, it not only incorporates the homely particulars of ‘Life among the Lowly’ into its universal 
scheme, but it gives them a power and a centrality in that scheme, thereby turning the socio-political order upside 
down” and raising the quotidian and domestic lives of readers to the level of revolutionary politics (139). All of this 
is to say that Stowe’s sentimentalism, and probably sentimentalism at large, follows the logic of martyrdom. 
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cause (abolitionism, in Stowe’s case) as they meanwhile model and encourage righteous 
behavior for their audience. The rhetorical success of this maneuver and Stowe’s novel at large 
thus relies at least in part on whether or not martyrdom can actually do anything positive for 
slaves. Insofar as Eva’s martyrological demise and Tom’s self-conscious martyrdom are central 
to Uncle Stowe’s Cabin’s project, then, critical work on the rhetorical strategies of sixteenth-
century martyrologies as described above can help us determine the degree to which Stowe’s 
rhetorical use of martyrdom can do anything for abolitionism.  
 Here, the work on sixteenth-century martyrologies discussed above also helps to 
elucidate the rhetorical limitations of martyrological abolitionism. It is common to state that 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin intensified and expanded abolitionism in antebellum America, if it didn’t 
actually instigate the Civil War, as Lincoln implied. However, that conception of Stowe’s 
martyrological project, along with similar conceptions of the nature of sentimentalism or the 
novel at large, conflates the political power of the martyr to do (to fight, persuade, resist, destroy, 
create, etc.) with its semiotic power to intensify (concepts of veracity, revolution, Christ-
likeness, etc.). Even Fisher’s essential analysis recognizes this limitation (“The feeling of 
suffering becomes [in sentimentalism] more important than action against suffering”) only to 
pass it by for the sake of grandiose praise all the same (“The paradox that follows from this 
modest theory is that Stowe’s novel is perhaps the single most effective political work of art in 
the history of literature”) (110, 182). My point is that any argument which posits Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin as superlatively effective as an abolitionist assault is an overestimation wherein the 
martyr’s power to make anything happen is confused with the martyrologist’s power to push 
meaning - this applies to Tom and Eva as well as it applies to Harriet Beecher Stowe herself. 
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 This is not to agree with Ann Douglas, however, who oversimplifies the case when she 
writes in “The Legacy of American Victorianism: The Meaning of Little Eva” that the girl’s 
death is “essentially decorative” and accordingly “doesn’t actually convert anyone. Her 
sainthood is there to precipitate our nostalgia and our narcissism” (2). For Douglas, Eva’s death 
makes nothing happen specifically because it is sentimental, which Douglas famously argues is a 
passive ”rationalization of the economic order” of nineteenth-century American conspicuous 
consumption; as such, sentimentalism functions in nineteenth-century America to undercut the 
more rigorous, Puritanical mode of intellectual work that preceded it without offering 
comparable social criticism in return. Since 1977, critics such as Jane Tompkins, Philip Fisher, 
Gillian Brown, and many others have persuasively contravened Douglas to show that Stowe’s 
sentimentalism was far more than cloyingly decorative and may have been powerfully political 
and capable of moving an audience - it’s at least too complicated to be just decorative. It's now 
easy to agree with Tompkins, for example, when she argues that Uncle Tom’s Cabin is the 
“summa theologica of nineteenth-century America’s religion of domesticity, a brilliant redaction 
of the culture’s favorite story to tell itself - the story of salvation by mother love” (125). I would 
add that even Tompkins’s famous assessment flirts with the logic of martyrdom without 
recognizing its importance. 
And yet I agree with Douglas that Stowe’s formulation of “Little Eva’s beautiful death, 
which Stowe presents as part of the protest against slavery, in no way hinders the working of that 
system” (2). I think this is the case because, as critics like Monta and Breitenberg have shown, 
the nature of martyrological communities, which Stowe’s novel hopes to build against slavery, is 
that they are not reliably persuasive; their tautological nature can only intensify abolitionism that 
already exists. In fact, it might be worse than that: Douglas points out that “[l]ike her 
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descendants [in sentimental fiction], [Eva] flatters the possibilities of her audience; she does not 
quicken their aspirations” (3). This is because sentimentalism at large (and Stowe’s in particular) 
is martyrological and hence invites its audience to participate only empathically rather than 
actively. If the martyrologist’s doctrine continues to be non poena sed causa - that is, the cause, 
and not the death, makes the martyr - then Christians can participate in the martyr’s 
righteousness by simply empathizing with their cause instead of acting on its behalf; in 
antebellum America, then, they could live for abolitionism rather than die for it. 
This same logic allowed Frederick Douglass a few years later to claim that John Brown 
was an even more dedicated abolitionist than himself, insisting, “I could live for the slave, but he 
could die for him” (“Was John Brown Wrong?” 12). Although Douglass martyrized Brown and 
appealed to sentiment with the best of them, I will argue in the next section that he also stepped 
outside the martyological tradition to imagine Brown not as validation of abolitionism, but as a 
transformative force and rhetorical weapon for terrorizing slaveholders. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS AND THE “JOHN BROWN WAY” 
In his writings and speeches, Frederick Douglass often apologized for Brown and his 
extremism, claiming him as a national hero and exemplar of patriotism. Part and parcel of this 
apology was an overt martyrization that named Brown the topmost, paragon abolitionist; in other 
words, martyrdom was one rhetorical strategy by which Douglass followed, encouraged, and 
even provoked his audience towards abolitionism in speech, article, and autobiography. Unlike 
the narrator of Uncle Tom’s Cabin or the other martyrologists in James Redpath’s Echoes of 
Harper’s Ferry, however, Douglass not only sought to validate his own cause or establish a 
behavioral model by martyrdom’s logic; he also found in Brown’s life and death the inauguration 
of a new, more aggressive abolitionism, which he dubbed “the John Brown way.” For Douglass, 
Brown did not validate the slow-moving abolitionism(s) that were already common in the North, 
but rather transformed the abolitionist stance into one of provocation and fear mongering. In this 
latter use of martyrdom, then, Douglass was able to step outside of the martyrological tradition in 
America, solving the problem of its tautology by applying the image of John Brown directly to 
slaveholders in addition to his fellow abolitionists.  
Douglass was involved enough with Brown in the years leading up to the raid on 
Harper’s Ferry that there may have been a $2,500 bounty put on his head in October 1859 (if 
true, this would be more than any other of Brown’s co-conspirators, besides the equally sought 
William Seward) and the New York Herald put out a call for his arrest (Reynolds 359, 341). 
When he famously ran to Canada and then Europe in response to Brown’s hanging, he was 
criticized by pro- and anti-slavery forces as a coward and wrote insistently throughout the rest of 
his career as public intellectual that he had nothing to do with Brown’s radical violence, which 
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he did in fact refuse to assist (though he encouraged Shields Green to go).24 However, in the 
years after Brown’s hanging, Douglass arguably did more for Brown’s legacy than any American 
intellectual besides the Transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau, even praising Reconstruction 
as a continuation of Brown’s work.25 Rather than distancing himself from the Old Man’s image, 
he actively defended and even extolled Brown as a sane and uncompromisingly righteous 
abolitionist as well as a patriotic American. In fact, he mentions Brown in all four of his 
autobiographies and many of the huge number of smaller pieces he wrote and delivered after 
1859.  
As early as 1873,26 Frederick Douglass was regularly delivering a speech called “Was 
John Brown Wrong?” (hereafter “John Brown”) which is probably the most thorough and overt 
example of Douglass’s martyrizing the Old Man. It should come as no surprise that the answer to 
the question of his title is no; just as predictably, a large part of his argument runs homologous to 
the arguments described above in Redpath’s Echoes of Harper’s Ferry and Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 
Namely, Douglass does not shy away from formulaically martyrizing his friend to the 
abolitionist cause, and instead follows something like a non poena sed causa color-by-number 
that redundantly draws on Brown’s biography and the history of the Civil War to stage an attack 
on racial injustice before and after the war. Douglass insists that Brown was a “martyr and a 
hero” because he gave his life for the lives of slaves and therefore “was a thousand times more 
                                               
24 James H. Cook argues that Douglass never stopped engaging with Brown’s story, both as a way of pushing 
abolitionism and as a way of defining his own antislavery position: specifically, “Brown’s ultimate sacrifice became 
the means by which Douglass deflected criticism levied against him by leading African Americans,” who were 
consistently his greatest critics (130).  
On a different note, little is known of Brown’s response to Douglass’s rejection because he said nothing of it 
publically between the raid and his hanging - however, he might not have been so pleased. According to David 
Reynolds’s John Brown Abolitionist, one Mrs. Thomas Russell breached the topic with him in jail: “Of Frederick 
Douglass, who, he said, had ruined a great opportunity, he declared, ‘“That we owe to the famous Mr. Frederick 
Douglass!” and he shut his mouth in a way he had when he thought no good’” (387). 
25 Interestingly enough, “the John Brown Party,” where leading Bostonian Transcendentalists celebrated the signing 
of the Emancipation Proclamation, Douglass even led the crowd in Brown’s favorite hymn, implying a causal link 
between the two historical events (4). 
26 This is according to Gerald W. Fulkerson in The Frederick Douglass Papers: Series One, Volume 5. 
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effective as a preacher than as a warrior” (13, 23). Following the martyrological tradition, “John 
Brown” argues that the Old Man’s weird life and abolitionist cause subsume his death, both of 
which “marched on” according to Douglass precisely because the Virginian government “could 
kill him, but they couldn’t answer him” (23). Douglass states throughout this speech that Brown 
surpasses him precisely because he epitomizes abolitionism by obtaining martyr status, which 
Douglass understands to be the ultimate indication of his confident commitment to abolition and 
his apparently extraordinary “hatred to oppression.”27 
More than just outright proclaiming Brown’s success in obtaining the status of a martyr, 
though, Douglass also relies on the logic of martyrdom to subtend and unite the otherwise 
disparate interests of “John Brown.” Accordingly, the address’s first sentence, which is nearly 
two hundred words, ends with a positive proclamation of his threefold objective: 
to pay a just debt long due, to vindicate in some degree a great historical character 
of our own time and country, one with whom I was myself well acquainted, and 
whose friendship and confidence it was my good fortune to share, and to give you 
such recollections, impressions and facts, as I can, of a grand, brave and good old 
man, and especially to promote a better understanding of the raid upon Harper’s 
Ferry of which he was the chief, is the object of this address. (8) 
Under the catchall “just debt long due,” Douglass here explains that his objectives are: (1) to 
reclaim John Brown as an important historical figure, (2) to describe his personal experience of 
Brown, and (3) “especially” to clarify and interpret Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry. The first and 
third of these are similar, though distinct in that they describe different types of historiography 
(i.e., the reclamation of a historical figure versus the retelling of an event). His second objective, 
                                               
27 Cook argues that Douglass’s conception of Brown reveals that Douglass “embraced the notion of a hierarchy of 
commitment among abolitionists,” topmost of which was Brown (Cook 143). According to Douglas himself, this 
conception is to some extent martyrological. 
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alternatively, is a type of personal testimony that is generically at odds with the larger-scale 
historicizing of the other objectives (which are more purposive and didactic than the narrative 
mode of testimony). Nevertheless, in Douglass’s hands, it is testimony that makes historical 
arguments possible by providing evidence for their larger claims. That is, Douglass’s personal 
account of his relationship with Brown - and not, more predictably, a defense of radical violence 
or antinomianism, for example - is made to somehow bear evidence upon his defense of Brown 
as an historical figure and successful abolitionist. This is to say that Douglass is able to imagine 
and present these three objectives as one argument thanks to a logic by which personal 
experience can somehow verify a larger cause - as I have argued above, it is the logic of 
martyrdom that (tautologically) unites the self and meaning in this way. My point is that “Was 
John Brown Wrong?” doesn’t just martyrize Brown by reshaping the narrative of his life and 
death (which it does28), but, like Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Cheever’s “The Martyr’s Death and the 
Martyr’s Triumph,” is in fact rhetorically possible only by the logic of martyrdom.29 
Douglass is thus able to move directly from an overt appeal for Brown’s martyrdom into 
an analysis of the Old Man’s life with the common-sensical air of self-evidence that martyrologic 
provides him: “With John Brown, as with every other man fit to die for a cause, the hour of his 
physical weakness was the hour of his moral strength … In studying the character and works of a 
great man, it is always desirable to learn in what he is distinguished from others, and what have 
been the causes of this difference” (23). As it does for Harriet Beecher Stowe and James Redpath 
                                               
28 For example, Douglass includes apocryphal biographical information that was considered accurate even through 
the 20th century. More importantly, Douglass smooths over Brown’s many business and domestic failures in order 
to inaccurately describe an “even-tempered,” independent man without prejudice. This is important because it 
reveals Douglass’s efforts to mold Brown into his conception of a “self-made man” as he does himself in his own 
autobiographies. 
29 This is how Douglass can insist that he is not philosophizing or politicking with this address, but only humbly 
remembering a friend: “Mine is the word of grateful memory to an old friend; to tell you what I know of him ... of 
what he did and what he attempted, and thus if possible to make the mainspring of his actions manifest and thereby 
give you a clearer view of his character and services” (11). If this is true, despite Douglass’s polemical tone 
throughout, not to mention the didacticism of his conclusion, it is thanks to his appeal to martyrologic. 
36 
 
elsewhere, the martyrologic of this passage enables Douglass to read Brown’s abolitionism, the 
character of his life, and the history of his death as if they were one indistinct phenomenon and 
likewise connect two otherwise unrelated sentences with a dubious and not even stated 
“therefore.” He can now proceed to highlight those aspects of Brown’s biography that make him 
the paragon abolitionist according to his own rubric, which he establishes shortly thereafter: “a 
man of commanding mold, towering high and alone above the millions, free from all 
conventional fetters, true to his own moral convictions, a ‘law unto himself,’ ready to suffer 
misconstruction, ignoring torture and death for what he believes to be right” (12).30 Importantly, 
the last bit of this definition distinguishes the paragon and the run-of-the-mill abolitionist by the 
former’s martyrdom, his willingness to “suffer … for what he believes to be right.” Thus, at this 
stage in his argument, Douglass has caught himself in the same martyrological tautology that 
limits the rhetoric of abolitionists like Stowe, Cheever, and even John Foxe; that is, he both 
implies and outright declares that abolitionists can know John Brown is a successful abolitionist 
because he was a martyr, and they can know he was a real martyr because he was a successful 
abolitionist. 
As a 19th-century American abolitionist, and former Garrisonian at that, Douglass was 
obviously indebted to the white Christian discourse that dominated his era for this kind of 
language. Critics have made much of the paradox and problem of Douglass’s rhetorical mastery, 
                                               
30 This is an archetype that bears significant kinship to Douglas’s “self-made man,” which he describes first in 1872, 
the year before “Was John Brown Wrong?” first appeared. In his address “Self-Made Men,” Douglass describes in 
his characteristically polemical tone his theory of the self-made man who strives himself out of societal bonds and 
into success despite hardship and regardless of luck (he admonishes his captive audience, “WORK! WORK!! 
WORK!!! WORK!!!!”). Indeed, Douglass’s description of the self-made man and John Brown are nearly identical: 
“Self-made men are the men who, under peculiar difficulties and without the ordinary helps of favoring 
circumstances, have attained knowledge, usefulness, power and position and have learned from themselves the best 
uses to which life can be put in this world, and in the exercises of these uses to build up worthy character. ... They 
are in a peculiar sense, indebted to themselves for themselves.” I think this is important because it shows that 
Douglass is repurposing the details of Brown’s life and character to fit an abolitionist paradigm Douglass has 
already been at work propagating. For more on Douglass’s repurposing pre-established history and rhetoric for his 
own purposes, see Eric Ashley Hairston’s “The Virtuous Voice of Frederick Douglass” in The Ebony Column. 
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the first book-length study of which was probably Frederick May Holland’s 1891 Frederick 
Douglass: The Colored Orator. More recently, in his chapter “The Virtuous Voice of Frederick 
Douglass” from The Ebony Column, Eric Ashley Hairston admirably parses Douglass’s 
rhetorical influences both classical and Christian, starting with The Columbian Orator, which 
Douglass mentions in his autobiographies. Other critics focus on what they consider the 
insuperable limitations of Douglass’s position as an educated former slave orating expertly to 
whites who have little direct experience of slavery.31 Joseph Fichtelberg and Richard A. 
Yarborough, for example, seem to agree that Douglass, in Fichtelberg’s terms, “succeeded only 
in reproducing the clichés of his oppressors” (120). In a larger sense, Yarborough wonders, 
“whether the tools of the master can ever be used to achieve the complete liberation of the slave” 
(178). Without putting it in the same lofty terms, critics like Peter Walker and James J. Cook are 
more optimistic in their implication that the master’s tools can be used to free the slave. Walker, 
for instance, argues compellingly that “Douglass diverted autobiography from its basic mode of 
revealing the writer, subordinated a conception of self to an ideology, and turned an art form into 
a tract” (213). I can’t pretend to solve this debate, especially because I think it is largely 
misguided in its attempt to diagnose the degree of Douglass’s liberty, rhetorical and otherwise. 
Additionally, as these latter critics and others have argued, it is simply undeniable that, as a 
trained and highly skilled rhetorician, Douglass took advantage of certain traditions and logics of 
the dominant culture of his time. My point, however, is that the logic of martyrdom should be 
recognized as chief among these logics that Douglass utilized for abolitionism and racial justice. 
Unlike some other strategies by which he appealed to the reason and Christian sympathy 
of his audience, however, Douglass’s martyrological strategy was designed to provoke his 
                                               
31 See, for example, the short section on Douglass in Donald Pease’s “From the Camp to the Commons: Biopolitical 
Alter-Geographies in Douglass and Melville.” 
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Northern audience and terrorize the South. Such aggression is characteristic of Douglass who, 
despite his contention that “every possible way known in opposition to slavery is my way,” 
clearly preferred strident provocation over Garrisonian moderation, especially in the time 
approaching and during the Civil War (“John Brown’s Contribution to Abolition” 413).32 Indeed, 
Douglass himself insisted, “I believe in agitation” (416).33 Accordingly, Douglass attempts to 
move away from this circular trap by insisting that Brown has done more than only validate or 
epitomize abolitionism - he has also transformed it. Douglass avers that Brown is important 
because he changed abolitionism from a matter of politics and sentiment to a matter of war: that 
is, if he “did not end the war that ended slavery, he did at least begin the war that ended slavery” 
(35). Making war on slavery was Brown’s intention by Douglass’s estimation, meaning that 
Brown did not fail but actually succeeded in abolishing slavery by instigating the fear and 
violence that led to the Civil War and the manumission of slaves.34 Hence, Douglass considers 
his third objective to be “especially” important because it intends to show how Brown’s work fits 
within a larger project of provocation rather than traditional military success or merely symbolic 
                                               
32 For more on Douglass’s storied relationship to violence in speech and in act see James H. Cook’s “Fighting with 
Breath, Not Blows: Frederick Douglass and Antislavery Violence” in Antislavery Violence, and Richard 
Yarborough’s “Race, Violence, and Manhood: The Masculine Ideal in Frederick Douglass’s ‘The Heroic Slave’” in 
Haunted Bodies: Gender and Southern Texts.  Leslie Friedman Goldstein’s “Violence as an Instrument for Social 
Change: The Views of Frederick Douglass (1817-1895)” convincingly argues that Douglass was always comfortable 
with antislavery violence and was never a total nonresistant but rather preached and accepted nonresistance as an 
occasionally appropriate “tactical” and situational advantage rather than a moral imperative. 
33 This is a position that Douglass pushes fiercely in other writings as well. For example, the November 1859 issue 
of his Douglass’ Monthly is largely dedicated to the raid on Harper’s Ferry, including Douglass’s own “Capt. John 
Brown Not Insane.” This short defense of Brown is the first in the issue and, like the 1881 address, relies on 
Douglass’s own experience in conjunction with Brown’s reported behavior in jail (he wouldn’t be hanged for 
another month from the time of this article’s publication) to respond to accusations that Brown was either motivated 
by petty revenge or flat out insane. More specifically, Douglass admits that he is not surprised by Brown’s enemies 
who level the insanity charge, but rather by Brown’s professed allies, who, following the Old Man’s first lawyer 
Lawson Botts, tried to establish Brown’s hereditary insanity so as to keep him from the gallows. Like other 
martyrologists of Brown, Douglass declares Brown’s martyrdom without arguing for it as if his martyr status is self-
evident or at least indisputable. Unlike other martyrologists, however, Douglass imputes more than just symbolic 
status to Brown’s violence in that “he has struck the bottom line of the philosophy that underlies the abolition 
movement” (459). Again, according to Douglass, Brown’s martyrdom doesn’t only verify his abolitionist cause, but 
actually transforms and intensifies it. 
34 This is also David Reynolds’s thesis in John Brown: Abolitionist. 
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victory. Accordingly, Douglass explains, “[Brown] believed this movement [at Harper’s Ferry] 
would weaken slavery in two ways - first by making slave property insecure, it would become 
undesirable; and secondly it would keep the anti-slavery agitation alive and public attention fixed 
on it, and thus lead to the adoption of measures to abolish the evil altogether” (29). Martyrdom 
for Douglass is thus not an end, but an especially provocative means of promulgating a more 
radical, terrorizing kind of abolitionism, or what Douglass calls “the John Brown way.”35  
In “John Brown,” Douglass is fairly specific in his theory of terror’s impact on 
slaveholders and, more important, the economy of slaveholding. He explains this theory as if it 
was Brown’s, first averring that, like Locke, Brown considered slavery to be a state of war that 
underwrote any self-defensive action, violent or otherwise. Consequently, on the local scale, 
slaves “had a right to anything necessary to their peace and freedom,” though Brown himself 
sought to “shed no blood” and “avoid a fight” (29). Because the nation had grown callous to the 
horrific iniquities of slavery, however, “something startling” like Nat Turner’s rebellion was 
necessary to unsettle the institution. It would do so economically: Douglass argues that John 
Brown’s raid and his martyrdom were effective in “making slave property insecure” by using 
terror to make it “undesirable” (29). Douglass makes this argument, thinly veiled here as 
Brown’s, more explicitly in his 1860 speech “John Brown’s Contributions to the Abolition 
Movement.” There, in Boston, on the one year anniversary of Brown’s hanging, Douglass insists 
that abolitionists “must reach the slaveholder’s conscience through his fear of personal danger” 
(417). This doesn’t necessitate murder, so long as the emotionally and physically wounded return 
to the South as “living epistles of the free gospel” whose personal fear begets an aversion to 
                                               
35 What exactly the John Brown way is remains an open question, both in terms of Brown’s intentions (discussed 
briefly in the second section of this paper) and Douglass’s own thinking. Critics continue to debate the extent of 
Douglass’s radicalism. See, for example, Nicholas Buccola’s The Political Thought of Frederick Douglass, Waldo 
E. Martin, Jr.’s The Mind of Frederick Douglass, and Goldstein’s article. 
40 
 
potentially dangerous slaves and slaveholding. In both these speeches and others, then, Douglass 
martyrizes Brown so as to promulgate his own loose program of abolition as economic 
disruption by way of terrorism. 
Douglass’s book-length autobiographical work relies on this same logic; that is, the 
martyrdom developed in Douglass’s autobiographies Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass 
and My Bondage and My Freedom is designed not to portray Douglass as a christic figure who 
can validate abolitionism at large, but rather to underscore the value of violence and terror in 
weakening the slaveholder’s otherwise unqualified power over the slave. This is most obvious in 
Douglass’s relationship with Edward Covey and especially their famous physical altercation, 
which Douglass calls a “resurrection” in both autobiographies. Douglass responds to Covey’s 
first onslaught by going to Thomas Auld, hoping that his abused appearance (which is 
conspicuously reminiscent of the passion) will stir his master to humanitarian aid. Importantly, 
sentimental empathy fails because Auld successfully “repressed his feelings and became cold as 
iron” (MBMF, 174). When Douglass finally returns to St. Michael’s, he and Covey fight for two 
hours, but not at first - the altercation is held off until after the Sabbath, meaning that three days 
(one at Auld’s, one in the woods, and Sunday at St. Michael’s) pass between Douglass’s horrific 
beating and his defeat of Covey. His victory here is not dependent on Covey’s death, but only on 
the fear the proceeds to “prevent [Covey’s] injuring” Douglass for the next six months (186). 
Thus, martyrdom in Douglass’s first two autobiographies doesn’t prove or signify anything, as it 
does for Stowe and Brown, but rather intensifies Douglass’s successful use of terror and violence 
in gaining freedom. 
Which is to say that the style of Douglass’s investment in martyrologic in “John Brown” 
and elsewhere lands him outside the standard martyrological tradition described in my 
41 
 
introduction. His conception and use of martyrdom show little interest in assuaging anxieties, 
buttressing beliefs, or guiding upright behavior; nor does it work to persuade its audience by 
reason or sentiment. Douglass does not resort to martyrdom exclusively for semiotics, semantics, 
or ethics - not for meaning, that is - but as a flare that shines directly on the issue of slavery, 
elucidating its abjection for both slaveholders and abolitionists so as to provoke them towards 
recognizing and remembering its gross iniquities. Unlike the overdetermination of death and 
suffering in more standard martyrologies, death and suffering for Douglass are asemiotic insofar 
as they are not to be believed but rather obeyed (though they are probably preferable to slavery). 
Ultimately, martyrdom’s consistent appearance in Douglass’s autobiographies and speeches 
follows the trend that Cook has observed, namely “the level of physical confrontation within 
Douglass’s daily life declined at the very time that he turned to embrace the rhetoric of violence” 
(130). I would add that this rhetoric of violence is often delivered by the logic of martyrdom. In 
other words, if Stowe and Brown used martyrology to foment an abolitionist community and 
verify abolitionist righteousness, Douglass used martyrology expressly to provoke the 
abolitionist community and terrorize the slaveholding community. 
If this is the case (that is, if we can take Douglass at his word when he says he believes 
the raid on Harper’s Ferry “is not a story to increase our sense of social safety and security, but 
to fill the imagination with wild and troubled fancies of doubt and danger”), it is conspicuous 
that he gave the “Was John Brown Right?” address at Harper’s Ferry in 1881. In fact, the 
proceeds of the event’s publication went towards the establishment of a John Brown 
Professorship at the new Storer College in that town. Appropriately, he starts his address with a 
long sentence whose first handful of dependent clauses proclaim otherwise, negatively defining 
his objective in conspicuously thorough detail: 
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Not to fan the flame of sectional animosity now happily in the process of rapid 
and I hope permanent extinction, not to revive and keep alive a sense of shame 
and remorse for a great national crime, which has brought its own punishment, in 
loss of treasure, tears and blood, not to recount the long list of wrongs, inflicted 
on my race during more than two hundred years of merciless bondage; nor yet to 
draw, from the labyrinths of far-off centuries, incidents and achievements 
wherewith to rouse your passions, and enkindle your enthusiasm. (7) 
The dependent clause on which this nearly hundred word quotation relies is deferred for nearly 
another hundred words; meanwhile, Douglass’s repeated negations (“not” three times and “nor” 
once) are buried or overwhelmed by his catalogue of the long and terrible violence of the slavery 
era. His tone is suspiciously aggressive for an ex-slave who claims to only be interested in 
moving on: “shame and remorse,” “loss of treasure, tears and blood,” “two hundred years of 
merciless bondage,” and “labyrinths of far-off centuries” are all agonistic phrases that are too 
descriptive to be cast off regardless of Douglass’s qualifications (especially considering that 
these are the first images of the address). In fact, in the next paragraph, Douglass concedes 
outright, “there is no subject which in its interest and importance will be remembered longer, or 
will form a more thrilling chapter in American history than this strange, wild, bloody and 
mournful drama” (8).  
And yet, Douglass finds it necessary to describe that drama at length throughout his 
speech; in so descriptively and lengthily cataloguing the “sectional animosity” he claims to be 
avoiding, Douglass is pointing his audience to former conflict by ostentatiously putting it aside. 
Thus, this feign at the very start of his address allows Douglass to covertly do what he overtly 
says he will not do: underscore the horrors and injustices of slavery before and after the war by 
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martyrizing John Brown for a Southern audience at the site of the martyr’s crime and 
punishment. In this case, he did so to raise funds that would continue to preserve Brown’s legacy 
as fearfully extremist and violent. Even twenty years after the start of the war, then, Douglass 
continued to rely on martyrdom and its logic not to validate Brown’s cause but to highlight 
injustices, both historical and contemporaneous, while instigating a response that is economic 
and legal, and therefore more than martyrological. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EPILOGUE 
Although his popularity has undoubtedly decreased since Douglass’s time, John Brown 
continues to be thoroughly analyzed by scholars and used as a symbolic weapon by political 
radicals in the battle for racial equality in America. Such interpretations of his life and death, as 
well as the body of literature that envelopes him, continue to intensify the racial and political 
dialectic of his era by either lauding the nineteenth-century radical as their kind of guy or 
dismissing him as insane. Like his contemporaries, many of these writers look to Brown as a 
just(ified) race traitor and an exemplar of the abolition of whiteness, though they usually balk at 
or ignore altogether his violent means. Spanning 150 years, their common logic implies: that 
John Brown died in his extreme aversion to slavery and consequent efforts to free black slaves 
attests to both the enormous depth and the ultimate validity of his beliefs.  
As I have tried to argue, this formulation sounds unsurprisingly like martyrdom, 
(re)instating Brown as the paragon abolitionist or, by analogy to the anti-slavery movement of 
the nineteenth century, the paragon civil rights leader. In other words, just as nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century commentators martyrized Brown abolitionism, twentieth- and twenty-first-
century commentators martyrize Brown for social justice and racial equality. I want to argue that 
this is problematic insofar as it is not politically cogent, or insofar as it is preaching to the choir 
at best (even if it’s a pretty radical choir). In this paper, I have tried to show that martyrdom is 
axiomatic and tautological enough that it cannot create or effect the substantive change it targets 
in America culture, but rather can only intensify pre-existing, stratified oppositions. In Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, for example, martyrdom does not make an abolitionist of St. Clare but only 
catalyzes him (too late) in convictions he expressed long before Eva’s death; in other words, 
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martyrdom does not convert him, just as it is incapable of converting Legree, despite Tom’s 
protestations. Regardless of the conversion fantasy propagated by believers from Foxe to 
Redpath, martyrdom cannot persuade anyone outside its already willing audience: if it was ever 
capable of being surprising or subversive, that time has long passed. And though critics are often 
caught up in the same dialectics of John Brown and his jury, his use by abolitionists of whiteness 
and other radicals today attests to how compelling he could be, and that martyrdom remains an 
important stratum in assemblages of the media, politics, and entertainment in America.  
 Admittedly, however, and regardless of all this blowing, there is a very real sense in 
which none of this is a problem. In fact, the mechanics and strata of martyrdom are often a 
noticeable asset to Brown criticism. Modern critical response to Brown and the body of literature 
attached to him knowingly rely on martyrologic’s tautology to argue that Brown’s image was 
borne of both the copia of his circumstances and literary representations and Brown’s own 
personal acceptance of the title.36 Precisely insofar as they are not burdened with saying anything 
new, they can be confident of Brown’s righteousness and their own in turn so that this logic 
lends them a magisterial, insistent tone as well as an enthusiastic, willing audience. In this sense, 
my diagnosis is hardly damning for martyrdom and martyrology, but rather just a statement of 
the case. More than that, though, it’s not as if anyone but martyrologists extols martyrdom and 
its logic as anything other than preaching to the choir – my point that a martyr never made a 
                                               
36 See Charles Joyner’s “’Guilty of the Holiest Crime:’ The Passion of John Brown” and Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s 
“’A Volcano beneath a Mountain of Snow:’ John Brown and the Problem of Interpretation.’” For a more specific 
example, Paul Finkelman’s “Manufacturing Martyrdom: The Antislavery Response to John Brown’s Raid” argues, 
“Brown’s image as a martyr was shaped by the apparent unfairness of his trial, his letters from jail, his stoic 
behavior at gallows, and the efforts of antislavery activists to exploit his execution for the greater cause. This was, of 
course, what Brown had expected. It is why he understood that he was more valuable to the cause of antislavery as a 
dead martyr than as a living fugitive or a jailed convict” (46). In other words, John Brown is a martyr because of his 
(heterogeneous) circumstances, which proliferated because he allowed himself to be a martyr, which caused the 
proliferation his image as a martyr, etc. Finkelman is clearly not denying the tautology here. Also, to be fair, Brown 
was probably right: the indisputable weight of martyrdom probably was more useful to the already rolling 
mechanisms of the abolition movement than the ambivalence that plain violent radicalism would have been. 
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convert is hardly news. Thus, Foxe may hope persuade by leaving little alternative, but his book 
can only do so for those who enter their iconic presence to begin with, i.e. the inside of a church, 
and it does not pretend to address non-believers. Similarly, Redpath’s book was only popular in 
the North, where abolitionism was already flourishing, and he sent to Haiti, which obviously did 
not need convincing of the evils of slavery. In other words, as argued above, only those who are 
already interested in what John Brown means have any interest in arguing about his meaning – 
despite critics’ tendency to exaggerate, he’s hardly thought of outside circles of Americanists and 
radicals (and especially where those spheres overlap). The very nature of tautology at the heart of 
martyrology means that martyrdom is self-reliant and truly self-evident to those already within 
its circular logic, and so in this regard at least it obviously succeeds in spades, regardless of my 
complaining.  
Accordingly, following the specter of John Brown from the nineteenth century into 
contemporary scholarship – where he is most popular on the far left – bears out how inbent the 
appeal to the Old Man has to be. For instance, Redpath devoted his book to General Geffrard 
because he knew full well that the latter was of mixed heritage and already sympathized with 
blacks in the United States. Additionally, both his Echoes of Harper’s Ferry and A John Brown 
Reader, the two most important martyrologies of John Brown, lean towards abolitionism and 
civil rights, professedly using Brown to further their political agendas. Works by W.E.B. Dubois 
(John Brown) and Pulitzer Prize winner John Vincent Benet (John Brown’s Body), among 
others, continued this ardent tradition in the name of racial equality, though to varying degrees of 
ambivalence. Indeed, in his biography of Brown, W.E.B. Dubois makes no bones about his 
interest in the Old Man actually being an interest in the souls of black folks and their fair 
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treatment in America then and always.37 In the decades since Brown’s historical moment, it’s as 
if critics and scholars like to see themselves as part of the liberal community of his martyrdom, 
crusading against injustice and intensifying his martyr status, which they erroneously take as 
validation of their own cause. 
Louis Ruchames's A John Brown Reader, published in 1959 on the one-hundredth 
anniversary of the Raid on Harper’s Ferry, is largely a reproduction of Redpath’s in that it 
republishes many of the same pieces with similarly expressed intentions. It assumes that Brown’s 
actions can be a lesson for those who sympathize and thereby engender more action and self-
sacrifice towards combatting a similar enemy one hundred years later.38 Even when anthologized 
writers in these martyrologies criticize Brown or admit that his violent means only hardly 
justified his ends, they ultimately praise the raid at Harper’s Ferry for catalyzing the Civil War or 
bringing America closer to racial justice. On the other hand, some (usually Southern) critics 
demonize the radical as a madman and a terrorist, as in, for example, the behavioral studies that 
divest Brown of agency and sanity so as to evacuate his use as a symbol of any meaning.39 This 
maneuver relies on the same logic as the martyrdom it combats, as if they are flip sides of the 
same coin, but it hopes to undercut the meaning of Brown’s life and death by relegating it to 
insanity rather than extolling it.  
 Whether lauding him or divesting him of value, then, the critical response to Brown tends 
to only rehash and intensify the dialectics of his day rather than attending to the particularities of 
                                               
37 His preface overtly racializes Brown’s martyrdom: “But even in the absence of special material the broad truths 
are clear, and this book is at once a record of and a tribute to the man who of all Americans has perhaps come 
nearest to touching the real souls of black folk” (7). 
38 The introduction announces, “This anthology, by presenting the John Brown tradition, seeks to contribute to a 
firmer understanding of one of the vital aspects of American history, as well as to help our own generation, in a 
small way, toward a greater appreciation of those very ideals which motivated Brown and his friends” (15). That 
Ruchames calls it the “John Brown tradition” points, I think, to martyrology’s dialogical structure, its community 
and subjectivity formulation, as well as his anthology’s willing role in its formation. 
39 See Kenneth R. Carroll’s “A Psychological Examination of John Brown” or William Keeney’s “Hero, Martyr, 
Madman: Representations of John Brown in the Poetry of the John Brown Year, 1859-1860.” 
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his weird life and death: it always amounts to North vs South, pro- vs anti- slavery, white vs 
black, etc. Oddly enough, though, most critical studies of Brown’s legacy, of book or article 
length, tend to start by reviewing this dichotomous audience as if to mark territory and declare 
allegiance to the tradition of one side or the other. This is to say that the only people interested in 
looking to John Brown's life for meaning are those that have already decided on its meaning. 
They use his life and legacy to make a larger argument with the aim of a pre-decided end to 
which Brown is relied upon to contribute positively or negatively. Even the pieces that aim to 
complicate these binaries often only succeed in recognizing and describing them, thereby amping 
up their intensity.40 Regardless of their goal, and parallel to the strategy used by Redpath and 
other martyrologists, this usually includes regurgitating the same information within largely the 
same logic, though the focus may vary from piece to piece. In other words, the problem with 
most Brown history and criticism is that it is preaching to the choir at best and uselessly 
repetitive at worst – that is, Brown criticism is fundamentally martyrological even as (or 
precisely because) it seeks to analyze a martyr.41 
 That said, it’s not alone: the same kind of rhetorical and critical redundancy can also be 
seen in the criticism of John Foxe's book. In “The End of Reading: The Practice and Possibility 
                                               
40 See Terrible Swift Sword and His Soul Goes Marching On for abundant examples of this. In fact, the section 
headings of the former collection read “Contemporaries and Supporters of John Brown,” “John Brown Defined,” 
and “Behavioral Analyses of John Brown,” as if critics can only possibly agree or disagree with Brown. In 
Redpath’s and Ruchames’s anthologies, it’s even more explicit, of course. 
41 In Deleuzian terms, martyrdom may be the most easily reterritorialized form of political action or subversion, only 
relatively deterritorialized to begin with, and thus more effective as a black hole of subjectivity and a white wall of 
signifiance than anything else. Furthermore, because martyrology will always graft retrograde purposivity onto 
heterogeneous examples of experience, self-sacrifice, and suffering, and because its conclusions are always 
isomorphic and thus redundantly the same, martyrs and the logic of martyrdom can never say anything new, but can 
rather only prophesy a future their audience already knows in the present and already knew in the past. My point is 
that martyrdom is thus a defunct vehicle for social or political change, fundamentally conservative and far from 
radical, despite its reputation. Perhaps more importantly, though, it seems that any endeavor to hitch meaning to 
subjectivity, to announce after the fact the meaning of a life (or a thing, for that matter) must follow in 
martyrology’s enormous shadow. Consequently, it can only persuade by preponderance and not by reason precisely 
because it cannot account for the union of subjectification and significance – that is to say, martyrology is not 
abstract enough to account for both the virtual and the real, but it still works prodigiously to announce the meaning 
of things. In this sense, any analysis that endeavors to say what a thing means must go through the motions that 
martyrology blazed and is therefore beholden to its strict and pre-established limitations. 
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of Reading Foxe's "'Actes and Monuments,'” Ryan Netzley argues that “Foxe criticism 
reproduces Foxe’s polemical aims” when it endeavors to explain what his book means, as if that 
meaning is lacking and must be provided by critics (187). Consequently, “if the example of Foxe 
criticism teaches us anything about critical procedure in general, it is that the protocols of 
rigorous, respectable literary scholarship may, in fact, load the hermeneutic dice in 
Protestantism’s favor” (196). The reason for this goes back to Breitenberg’s estimation that the 
“Actes and Monuments” is an “iconic” text more than a rhetorical one and therefore doesn’t need 
to be accessible or even readable. According to Netzley, what Foxe’s book “aims to do, or avows 
to aim to do, is coterminous with what it does, which may be gleaned, obviously, from its iconic 
presence” rather than from actually reading it (205). The end of reading, in this sense, is not 
reading itself or even the experience therein, but rather the purpose to which the “Actes and 
Monuments” is put, that is the teleological goal that reading and also analysis take on before they 
even start. The result is a critical apparatus that only repeats the very motions and conclusions of 
Foxe’s book to an audience that already knows and invests those motions and conclusions with 
legitimacy and value. 
 I agree with Netzley, here, but, in light of the parallel martyrology that I’ve traced in 
Brown, Redpath, Stowe, and Douglass, I want to expand his argument by suggesting that the 
tendency he describes is not endemic to Foxe’s book alone or even “protocols of rigorous, 
respectable literary scholarship” in general; rather, it is the result of the tyranny of martyrology's 
analytical demands and conspicuous limits. Martyrdom’s tautological foundation makes it 
nothing but preaching to the choir par excellence, self-evident exactly insofar as it is evident at 
all. It is consequently more a Derridean shibboleth – granting membership to the choir and 
cordoning off identities of its members – than it is a persuasive rhetorical or political gesture, 
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despite the fantasy of conversion that is evident from Foxe to Redpath to Ruchames. This means 
that it is not just Foxe’s book but martyrdom in general that “tends to deny not only reading’s 
usefulness but also perhaps its possibility as conventionally conceived” insofar as it doesn’t need 
to be read but rather only proliferate in order to intensify (Netzley 209). Likewise, in “John 
Brown and the Legacy of Martyrdom,” Eyal Naveh argues that “The significance of the 
paradigm [of martyrdom] derives above all from its ability to articulate binary contrasts: that the 
essence of a situation is the opposite of what it appears; … that the villain of the story turns into 
a revered saint and martyr; that the forces of law and order ultimately prove to be villains. … It is 
these binary contrasts that give rhetorical form and meaning to the narratives of martyred heroes” 
(81). While I agree that this is certainly what makes martyrdom so rhetorically powerful, I would 
add that this “ability to articulate binary contrasts” makes the logic of martyrdom woefully 
dialectical and hopelessly stuck that way. As Deleuze argues in The Logic of Sense, this is a 
problem insofar as “it is the profession and mission of the dialectician to establish antitheses 
everywhere where there are more delicate evaluations to be made, coordinations to be 
interpreted” (15). In the case of John Brown, nearly every critic is guilty of being a dialectician 
in this crudely reductive sense. I am not arguing that this is a symptom of critical ineptitude, but 
rather a limitation set on criticism by the logic of martyrdom. 
Obviously, it would be absurd for me to argue that most Brown critics are simply blind to 
the pre-established willingness of their audience, or that they’re kicking in open doors – W.E.B. 
Dubois probably didn’t intend his biography of Brown to persuade anyone but likely knew 
instead that it would strengthen the commitments of the already committed. In the twenty-first 
century, this legacy has opened into divergent social and political fields that usually lean towards 
liberalism or libertarianism. In an especially academic example, many critics within Whiteness 
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Studies use Brown to make adjurations of social change in its analyses of race and racism in 
America. These theorists rigorously take up the mantle of racial equality in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, arguing with a more conservative American cohort for the unwarranted 
basis of the white race towards eradication of whiteness as a racialized concept; they may 
occasionally mention Brown, but, as if recognizing his limitations, they choose not to make 
elaborate use of his martyrdom. For instance, David Roediger’s important texts The Wages of 
Whiteness and Toward the Abolition of Whiteness, as well as Alexander Saxton’s Rise and Fall 
of the White Republic, dedicate almost no time to Brown, while Theodore Allen’s Invention of 
the White Race only mentions him in passing as an exemplar of race relations.42 Clearly, 
Whiteness Studies recognizes that Brown is a weak rhetorical tool for making connections or 
bridging the gap between its definition of social justice and the current reality. 
 So, if in one sense everything here is as it should be, there is no problem, in another very 
real sense it is not so simple. The weighty self-evidence of martyrology is perhaps similar to 
what Deleuze and Guattari understand the state form gives to thought, namely “a gravity it would 
never have on its own, a center that makes everything … appear to exist by its own efficacy or 
on its own sanction” (375). The problem is that, far from being challenged or subverted by this 
gravity, the state also gains “a whole census” from the arrangement that raises the State to the 
“level of de jure universality” and unimpeachable authority (375). This is to say that although 
martyrs are often touted as great transgressors who subvert an oppressive hegemony in a gesture 
                                               
42 Roediger’s How Race Survived US History says virtually the same thing as The Wages of Whiteness, using Brown 
only to describe the radicalism of “the machinist and theorist Ira Steward” (103). Paying Brown slightly more 
attention, Allen’s The Invention of the White Race argues for the radicalism of “some Southern whites who were 
ready to make common cause with the black population to establish a society there based on racial equality of 
constitutional rights” by briefly comparing them to Brown: “They dared, and some died as John Brown had done, 
struggling side by side with African –American freedom fighters for their common cause, the end of racial 
oppression” (150). The latter relies exclusively on W.E.B. Dubois’s John Brown to make this point, in a move that 
seems to be more about gesturing to the dialogical structure of the John Brown choir than it is about making a 
cogent argument for racial justice. 
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towards something other and better than the State, they actually can only contribute to the state’s 
de jure universality, its rigid striation and dominance. This is because insofar as martyrdom is 
incapable of making connections even between its own fundamental parts, it is also incapable of 
making connections outside its own organization. It therefore has no recourse to anything but 
itself in tautology; in other words, it cannot access “outside thought,” the term Deleuze and 
Guattari borrow from Foucault to designate thinking in smooth space that is extricated from the 
rigidity of the state model. Thought that grapples with the exterior is in some ways the opposite 
of state thinking because it “does not think in conformity with what the State wants” (376). 
Insofar as martyrdom is incapable of grappling with its outside, it is incapable of challenging the 
State or moving away from what the State wants.43 
 In short, the problem arises when a martyrologist assumes that irrefutable proof inside the 
logic of martyrdom is equally irrefutable outside that logical organization; in such an 
assumption, he/she overreaches to make an argument that can only fall on deaf ears. Once again, 
I would argue that (at least of the writers and thinkers in this paper) Frederick Douglass stepped 
outside the martyrological tradition in his praise of Brown precisely because he suspected the 
impotence of martyrdom. In his Narrative, Douglass compares his suffering to that of Christ in 
describing his appearance, which, “From the crown of my head to my feet,” largely resembles 
standard images of the passion. My Bondage and My Freedom recycles much of the language of 
the Narrative in this episode, as it does elsewhere, but the changes here elucidate Douglass’s 
increased engagement with a Christian discourse and specifically the martyrdom he shows to be 
                                               
43 In Weird John Brown, Ted Smith notices something similar about Brown, though he puts it in the terms of Walter 
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence.” Smith argues that praise of Brown as a “freedom fighter” does not pit Brown 
against the state’s oppressive normativity, but rather conscripts him into the state’s legitimization: “Because it was 
continuous with violent means used by the state to seek the same end, the violence of John Brown … can be grafted 
in to the legitimacy that supports state violence. … In a nation dedicated to freedom, a freedom fighter can be 
incorporated in to the political body. This incorporation, more than any ethical calculations of means and ends, 
connects the violence of the freedom fighter with the deepest sources of legitimacy behind and within the state” 
(34). 
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ineffective. In the Narrative, he says, “I suppose I looked like a man who had escaped a den of 
wild beasts, and barely escaped them. In this state I appeared before my master. In My Bondage 
and My Freedom, however, Douglass writes, “Had I escaped from a den of tigers, I could not 
have looked worse than I did on reaching St. Michael’s. In this unhappy plight, I appeared before 
my professedly Christian master.” It could be the case that “den of tigers” is a subtle reference to 
Daniel and the increased naming of St. Michael’s is an ironic reminder of Christianity’s 
collusion with American slavery. In any case, Douglass’s emphasized qualification of his master 
Thomas Auld as “Christian” points to his failure in recognizing Douglass’s Christ-like suffering 
and thus the limits of sentiment’s empathic suffering, as well as limit of the martyr to create 
change or conversion. 
 I have tried to argue that this is the limitation variously negotiated by abolitionist 
martyrologies like Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Echoes of Harper’s Ferry. In the twenty-first century, 
this also means that when Ignatiev’s radical journal Race Traitor uses Brown as a mascot for the 
abolition of whiteness, it does nothing for the development and progression of the racial justice, 
despite their avowals.44 And yet, if relying on martyrdom to solve racism is demonstrably 
misguided, perhaps the diagnoses of racial inequality leveled by these radically liberal political 
groups, all singers in John Brown’s choir, remain valid. Perhaps martyrdom is capturing an 
energetic flow that would do better outside its strictures. Ultimately, it would seem that Douglass 
                                               
44 They publish in print and online “because they think that publishing … will help build a community of readers.” 
However, the language of their website belies their inefficacy in communicating with anyone outside what 
community already exists and believers: “If the task of the nineteenth century was to overthrow slavery, and the task 
of the twentieth century was to end legal segregation, the key to solving this country's problems in the twenty-first 
century is to abolish the white race as a social category - in other words, eradicate white supremacy entirely. John 
Brown represents the abolitionist cause. Nominally white, he made war against slavery, working closely with black 
people. … For those who suffer directly from white supremacy, John Brown is a high point in a centuries-long 
history of resistance; for so-called whites he is the hope that they can step outside of their color and take part in 
building a new human community.” This is the problem with martyrdom. 
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had it right: it is his “John Brown way” and his version of Brown’s martyrdom that should be 
both further studied and more often remembered. 
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